Interpretive Communities: The Missing Element in Statutory Interpretation by Blatt, William S.
University of Miami Law School
University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository
Articles Faculty and Deans
2001
Interpretive Communities: The Missing Element in
Statutory Interpretation
William S. Blatt
University of Miami School of Law, wblatt@law.miami.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/fac_articles
Part of the Jurisprudence Commons, and the Legislation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty and Deans at University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more
information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
William S. Blatt, Interpretive Communities: The Missing Element in Statutory Interpretation, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 629 (2001).
Copyright 2001 by Northwestem Univ =iy School of Law Pnrrd L- U.SA.
Northwesteri University Law Rmiew Vo, 95. N& 2
INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES: THE MISSING
ELEMENT IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
William S. Blatt*
A text acquires meaning only by reference to its readers. The shared
understanding of such readers constitutes the "interpretive community" for
the text.' The word "spirit," for example, means one thing to a painter and
another to a minister. Yet, despite their obvious importance,2 such interpre-
tive communities receive surprisingly little attention in the scholarly litera-
ture on statutory interpretation.
3
. William S. Blatt, Professor, University of Miami School of Law. I thank Bernard Bell, Jim Brud-
ney, Ken Casebeer, Mary Coombs, Bill Eskridge, John Ely, Dan Farber, Marc Fajer, Clark Freshman,
Phil Frickey, Barry Friedman, Elizabeth Garrett, Pat Gudridge, Fran Hill, Bradley Karkkainen, Don
Langevoort, John Manning, Peter Margulies, Mark Movsesian, John Nagle, Jeremy Paul, Jeffrey Ra-
chlinski, Bob Rasmussen, Rob Rosen, Steven Ross, Ed Rubin, Jane Schacter, Steve Schnably, David
Shapiro, Jonathan Siegal, Larry Solan, Peter Tiersma, and Nick Zeppos for their comments on this Arti-
cle. I also thank the participants at workshops at Vanderbilt Law School in October 1997 and at the
University of Miami in December 1999.
1 The concept of interpretive communities is most prominently featured in the work of Stanley Fish.
E.g., STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND TIlE PRACTICE OF
THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES (1989) [hereinafter FISH, NATURALLY]. As used hem an
interpretive community includes both readers and authors of texts. Fish uses this concept to explain why
there is substantial agreement on otherwise indeterminate texts. STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN
THIS CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNmES 338 (1980) ("IThe fact of agreement.
rather than being a proof of the stability of objects, is testimony to the power of an interpretive commu-
nity to constitute the objects upon which its members (also and simultaneously constituted) can then
agree."). "Fish's concept of interpretive communities is thus a sociological generalization ... rather
than a defense of objectivity or a guide to interpretation." RICHARD A. POSNER, TIlE PROBLF,%tS OF
JURISPRUDENCE 450 (1990). This Article does not claim that texts are determinant. It dos, however,
claim that particular communities have authority to construe certain texts.
2 See, eg., Cont'l Can Co. v. Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers & Warehouse Workers Union (In-
dep.) Pension Fund, 916 F.2d 1154, 1157 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.) ("You don't have to be
Ludwig Wittgenstein or Hans-Georg Gadamer to know that successful communication depends on
meanings shared by interpretive communities.'); Bradley C. Karkkainen, "Plain Meaning". Justice
Scalia's Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARV. J.L & PUB. POL'Y 401, 407 (1994)
("[E]ven the strictest textualist would acknowledge that the meanings of the words and sentences in a
statutory text are a function of their usages within a linguistic community.").
3 The literature on statutory interpretation is immense. Representative works include: GUIDO
CALABRESI, A COMMON LA~V FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); WILutAM ESKIRDGE, DYNAMJIC
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW (1997); Alexander Aleinikofr, Updating Statutory Interpretation. 87 MICII. L
REv. 20, 31 (1988); James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Stat-
utes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response? 93 MICH. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1994); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Su-
preme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L REV. 4 (1985);
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This is a huge omission. Statutes engage the following three distinct
communities: the policy community of specialized professionals found in
government bureaucracies, the political community of elected politicians,
and the public community of the general electorate. Recognizing these
communities dissipates much of the confusion surrounding statutory inter-
pretation.4 Judges vary their readings of statutes depending on which com-
munity comprises the audience for the decision, and rightly so. In a
representative democracy, judges usually should adopt the perspective of
the community responsible for the issue.
This Article explores the implications of interpretive communities for
three related questions. The first half of this Article considers the central
question in statutory interpretation scholarship: 5 "What is the appropriate
theory of statutory interpretation?"-a question that has inspired a debate
over the choice among textualist, purposive, and dynamic theories of inter-
pretation. Scholars tend to associate each theory with a different model of
legislative behavior. For example, the theory that relies on legislative pur-
pose presupposes that the legislature is a rational actor pursuing reasonable
ends. Although the models reflect assumptions that judges make in decid-
ing cases, they provide an incomplete picture of statutory interpretation.
The models do not describe the entire legislature as well as they describe
the communities within it. The rational actor model, for instance, describes
the actions of bureaucrats better than it does the actions of politicians or
voters. Therefore, in choosing a theory by which to interpret a statute, a
judge must consider which community is responsible for the issue before
her. Certain theories of interpretation apply more appropriately to some
communities than to others.
Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108
HARV. L. REV. 593 (1995); Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of
Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231; Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State,
103 HARV. L. REv. 405 (1989).
4 See Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme
Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REv. 195, 214 (1983) ("[C]onsistent and uniform rules for statutory construction
and use of legislative materials are not being followed today. It sometimes seems that citing legislative his-
tory is still, as my late colleague Harold Leventhal once observed, akin to 'looking over a crowd and pick.
ing out your friends."). Perhaps the greatest source of confusion is the canons of construction. Karl
Llewellyn demonstrated almost 50 years ago that for each canon an exception can be invoked. Karl N.
Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are
to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 401-06 (1950) (listing canons and counter canons). The choice
among theories of interpretation also spawns confusion. See infra text accompanying notes 14-21.
5 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42
STAN. L. REV. 321, 324 (1990) ("In the post-World War It em... legal scholars have preferred theories
that offer a unitary foundation for statutory interpretation. Much of the theoretical debate has been over
which of the competing foundations is the best one."); Jonathan R. Siegal, Textualism and Contextual-
ism in Administrative Law, 78 B.U. L. REv. 1023, 1024 (1998) ("The current debate about statutory in-
terpretation is often characterized as a battle between textualists and intentionalists.").
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The debate over interpretive theory blurs how courts should interpret
statutes with how they do interpret them.6 The second half of this Article
separates the descriptive from the normative by asking two additional ques-
tions. The first question is: "Why do judges agree on statutory interpreta-
tion?" Interpretive communities help explain a court's ultimate choice of
theory, its preferences among sources of legislative history, and the cases in
which it defers to administrative interpretation. The second question is:
"What rules of statutory interpretation should courts adopt?" Recognition
of the role of interpretive communities in government furthers our com-
mitment to representative democracy and the rule of law. Such recognition
reveals that some rules of interpretation provide useful guidance, others
only apply in limited circumstances, and still others are misleading.
This account sheds new light on important cases in statutory interpreta-
tion.7 One such case is United Steelworkers of America v. Weber.8 A cen-
tral case in current scholarship,9 Weber presented the question of whether
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 bars a voluntary affirmative action plan accord-
ing racial preferences to African Americans. Scholars use this case to illus-
trate the wide range of available approaches to statutory interpretation. An
appreciation of interpretive communities reveals, however, that Weber is
atypical. Weber presents the rare situation in which a court confronts a con-
troversial, high-profile issue. Most cases present policy or political issues
that offer a much narrower range of plausible arguments. Thus, Weber is in
fact a poor guide on how to read statutes, one that distorts as much as it
illuminates."
6 See Larry Alexander, Practical Reasoning and Statutory Interpretation, 12 LAw & PHIL 319, 326
(1993) (noting scholars' tendency to blend normative and descriptive observations).
7 Most cases discussed in this Article are drawn from WILLIAI N. ESKRIDOGE, JR. & PHILUP P.
FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND TIlE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
(1995), a leading casebook in the field. A Lexis search conducted on March 1, 2000 in the law review
database shows that most of these cases are widely cited: Chevron. U.S.A., Inc. r. Natural Res. Def.
Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (701 citations); United Steelworkers ofAm. %. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979)
(640 citations); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (561 citations); Green %. Bork
Mach. Laundry Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989) (222 citations); Griin %, Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S.
564 (1982) (160 citations); and United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985) (120 citations).
8 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
9 See ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, LEGISLATIVE PROCESs 855 (1995) ("Weber is one of the most
controversial statutory interpretation decisions of modem times. It has led to probing debates about the
powers and functions of legislative and judicial branches of government."); Philip P. Frickey, From the
Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L REv. 241, 245
(1992) (describing Weber as the most important statutory interpretation decision in the 1980s); see also
Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and the Idea of Progress, 94 MICII. L REV. 1546, 1561
(1996) (agreeing that much of the contemporary debate about statutory interpretation has been sparked
by Weber and observing that all current legislation casebooks use Weber as a principal case). The first
chapter in Professors Eskridge and Frickey's casebook on legislation centers on Weber. ESKRIDGE &
FRICKEY, supra note 7.
10 Preoccupation with "hard" cases pervades American legal scholarship. See generally Frederick
Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 399,407 (1985) ("Contemporary constitutional theory has be-
95:629 (2001)
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A second important case is Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council. One of the most important Supreme Court opinions
written during the last thirty years,12 Chevron requires that judges defer to
reasonable agency resolutions of issues left open by Congress.13 The Su-
preme Court, however, has applied this requirement erratically. An appre-
ciation of interpretive communities reveals why. Chevron erroneously
assigns most agency decisions to the political community. In fact, most
agency decisions fall within the policy domain, a realm in which courts also
claim authority. Accordingly, agency interpretations are not inviolate.
Judges can and should exercise independent judgment on policy issues de-
cided by agencies.
In a nutshell, interpretive communities are the missing element in
statutory interpretation. Current scholarship does not acknowledge that
statutes engage different communities. As a result, scholars miss a critical
factor in judicial decisions. Recognition of interpretive communities sup-
plies this factor and helps solve long-standing puzzles over how courts do
interpret statutes and how they should interpret them.
I. CURRENT SCHOLARSHIP ON STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
A. The Debate Over Theory
Scholars spend considerable energy debating the appropriate theory of
statutory interpretation. They offer three theories, which form a spectrum
(see chart below). In the center is intentionalism, which looks to legislative
intent, the traditional approach to interpreting statutes. 14 Legislative intent
can be understood either narrowly or broadly,' s as referring to either the ac-
come mired in a fixation with the decision of hard cases .... [T]he contemporary agenda has neglected
an enormous portion of constitutional law. It has forgotten the easy case."); H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the
Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 615 (1958) (distinguishing between the "core"
meanings of legal rules and the "penumbra" and observing that "preoccupation with the penumbra is... as
rich a source ofconfusion in the American legal tradition as formalism in the English').
It 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
12 See KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 110 (3d ed.
1994) (describing Chevron as "one of the most important decisions in the history of administrative law');
Cass I- Sunstein, Law andAdministration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2075 (1990) (describ-
ing Chevron as "one of the very few defining cases in the last twenty years of American public law").
13 See infra note 294.
14 See NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.05 (6th ed. 2000) (stat-
ing that when interpreting statutes, "'the intent of the legislature' is the criterion most oflen recited").
IS See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Legislative History Values, 66 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 365, 369-71, 391-95
(1990) (describing subjective and objective understandings of intent). Professor Eskridge further distin-
guishes among actual intent, conventional intent, and imaginative reconstruction. Id. at 380, 382-85;
Archibald Cox, Judge Learned Hand and the Interpretation of Statutes, 60 HARV. L. REV. 370, 370-71
(1947) (distinguishing between intent as "purpose" and intent as "specific particularized application").
632
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tual beliefs of legislators16 or an objective purpose independent of personal
views.1 7 The latter understanding has dominated since the New Deal.'8
In the last fifteen years, scholars have explored more extreme theo-
ries. 19 Textualists, most prominently Justice Scalia and Judge Easterbrook,
narrow the inquiry by focusing on statutory language.20 Dynamic interpret-
ers, notably Professors Eskridge, Sunstein, and Aleinikoff, broaden the in-
quiry by considering the best answer, the result a court would reach if
unconstrained by original intentions.2 '
Textualism Intentionalism DyamlmII I
I I I I
Statutory Actual Statutory Best
Language intent PuWpos Ansmwer
The debate over theory bears on the use of extrinsic sources to aid in in-
terpretation.22 Different theories support different attitudes towards legisla-
tive history.2 Intentionalists rely on legislative history as evidence of
intent,24 whereas textualists dismiss it as prone to manipulation. 6 Likeise,
16 See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the Court Room, 50 U.
CHI. L. REV. 800, 817 (1983). For a famous illustration, see Fishgold v. Sullivan Diydock & Repair
Corp., 154 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1946), aff'd, 328 U.S. 275 (1946) (reading narrowly a prc-war statute pro-
tecting persons in military service because prior to American entry into World War 11 Congress would
not have granted broad relief).
17 See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEIMS IN T11E
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1410, 1413-14 (10th ed. 1958).
18 See William S. Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation: A Study in Form and Substance, 6
CARDOZO L. REv. 799, 828-34 (1985) (describing the dominance of'purposive interpretation).
19 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dnamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L REV. 1479, 1507
(1987) ("Scholars from a variety of viewpoints agree that the idea of legislative intent is incoherent.");
Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use ofAuthority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis, 70 TEX. L
REv. 1073, 1087 (1992) (observing that adherence to intent of enacting legislature "has no serious de-
fenders in the academy").
20 See SCALIA, supra note 3, at 22 ("The text is the law, and it is the text that must be observed.");
Frank H. Easterbrook, What Does Legislative History Tell Us?, 66 CHL.-KENT L REV. 441,449 (1990)
("The objective of statutory interpretation is to give the text a meaning appropriate to our constitutional
republic.").
21 See Aleinikoff, supra note 3, at 21 (describing statutory interpretation as a voyage in which Con-
gress builds the ship, but courts set the course); Eskridge, supra note 19, at 1516; Cass R. Sunstein, Be-
yond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1584 (1988) (defending dynamic interpretation).
22 See Siegal, supra note 5, at 1029 ("A striking thing about the [current] debate is how much of it
concerns the question of whether the [permissible] context includes legislative history.").
23 See Zeppos, supra note 19, at 1080-81.
24 See Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-
Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1306 (1990) ("Legislative history is
relevant if the pertinent inquiry is congressional intent."); see also W. David Slawson, Legislatinv His-
95:629 (2001)
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different theories support different applications of the Chevron standard.
Most commentators believe that an intentionalist applying Chevron is more
likely to defer to an agency interpretation than is a textualist,27 either be-
cause text is more determinate than intent28 or because textualism subtly
expands the judicial role.29
Much of the debate over theory centers on the results in hard cases.
For example, in Weber, the theory of interpretation largely controlled the is-
tory and the Need to Bring Statutory Interpretation Under the Rule of Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 383, 395
(1992) (arguing that the use of legislative history is predicated upon the assumption that the law is legis-
lative intent).
25 See SCALIA, supra note 3, at 29-30 ("[L]egislative history should not be used as an authoritative
indication of a statute's meaning.").
26 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 651-52 (1990).
27 See ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 7, at 876-77; Karkkainen, supra note 2, at 460-61; Brad-
ford C. Mank, Is a Textualist Approach to Statutory Interpretation Pro-Environmentalist?: Why Prag-
matic Agency Decisionmaking Is Better than Judicial Literalism, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1231, 1248-
50 (1996); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 992
(1992) [hereinafter Merrill, Executive Precedent] (arguing that a textualist approach "if consistently fol-
lowed, would dramatically transform Chevron from a deference doctrine to a doctrine of antidefer-
ence"); Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WAStI. U. L.Q 351,
359-62 (1994) [hereinafter Merrill, Textualism] (observing that an increasingly textualist Supreme Court
has marginalized the deference doctrine); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hyperlextual-
ism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749,
752 (1995). But see Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doc-
trine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 53 (1998) (finding no relationship between a
judge's theory of interpretation and willingness to defer to agencies).
28 See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J.
511,521 (1992):
One who finds more often (as I do) that the meaning of a statute is apparent from its text and
from its relationship with other laws, thereby finds less often that the triggering requirement for
Chevron deference exists. It is thus relatively rare that Chevron will require me to accept an inter-
pretation which, though reasonable, I would not personally adopt. Contrariwise, one who abhors a
"plain meaning" rule, and is willing to permit the apparent meaning of a statute to be impeached
by the legislative history, will more frequently find agency-liberating ambiguity, and will discem a
much broader range of "reasonable" interpretation that the agency may adopt and to which the
courts must pay deference. The frequency with which Chevron will require that judge to accept an
interpretation he thinks wrong is infinitely greater.
29 See Merrill, Textualism, supra note 27, at 373 ("By changing the focus from what Congress in-
tended to what the ordinary reader would understand, textualism adopts, at least implicitly, a model of
the court as an autonomous interpreter."). Moreover,
[i]ntentionalism mandates an "archeological" excavation of the past, producing opinions in the
style of the dry archivist sifting through countless documents in search of the tell-tale smoking gun
of congressional intent. Textualism, in contrast, seems to transform statutory interpretation into a
kind of exercise in judicial ingenuity. The textualist judge treats questions of interpretation like a
puzzle to which it is assumed there is one right answer.... This exercise places a great premium
on cleverness ....
This active, creative approach to interpretation is subtly incompatible with an attitude of
deference toward other institutions-whether the other institution is Congress or an administrative
agency. In effect, the textualist interpreter does notfind the meaning of the statute so much as to
construct the meaning. Such a person will very likely experience some difficulty in deferring the
meanings that other institutions have developed.
Id. at 372.
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sue of whether affirmative action violated Title VII's ban on racial dis-
crimination.30  The principal opinions in [Veber reflect the divisions in in-
tentionalism. Justices Brennan and Rehnquist each used legislative intentlr aclff ren c • 32
to reach different conclusions. Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan
equated intent with statutory purpose,33 which was to improve the economic
position of blacks.3 4 Dissenting, Justice Rehnquist emphasized the immedi-
ate concern of the enacting legislators, 35 which was to eliminate overt dis-
36criminatory practices.
In a later case, Justice Scalia took a purely textualist position on af-
firmative action. Relying exclusively upon statutory interpretation, he ar-
gued for overruling Weber.37  In Weber itself, Justice Blackmun wrote a
30 More specifically, section 703(a), 78 Stat. 255 (codified as amended at 86 Stat. 109,42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a) (1994)), provided:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin.
Section 703(d), 78 Stat. 256,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d), provided:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor organization, or joint
labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retaining, including
on-the-job training programs to discriminate against any individual because of his race, color, re-
ligion, sex, or national origin in admission to, or employment in, any program established to pro-
vide apprenticeship or other training.
31 See United Steelworkers ofAm. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979) ("It is a familiar rule, that a
thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit,
nor within the intention of its makers."') (quoting Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457,
459 (1892)); id. at 253 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Our task in this case, like any other case involving
the construction of a statute, is to give effect to the intent of Congress.").
32 See Burt Neubome, Observations on Weber, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 546, 554 (1979) (noting that Jus-
tices Brennan and Rehnquist asked different questions: Justice Brennan searched for "statute's core pur-
pose," whereas Justice Rehnquist asked "how members actually would have voted had the question
explicitly been put to them").
33 See Weber, 443 U.S. at 202 (relying on the "purpose of the statute") (quoting United States v.
Public Utils. Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295,315 (1953)).
34 See id. at 202-03.
35 See id. at 220 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (relying on the understandings of"all Members of Con-
gress who spoke to the issue during the legislative debates"); see also id. at 254 (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing) ("Cilose examination of what the Court proffers as the spirit of the Act reveals it as the spirit
animating the present majority, not the 88th Congress.").
36 See id. at 237-51.
37 See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 670 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Wcber disre-
garded the text of the statute, invoking instead its 'spirit.') (quoting Holy Trinity Church v. United
States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)). Justice Burger's opinion in eber also gave great weight to text. See
95:629 (2001)
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concurrence appealing to best answer. By 1979, the Court had held that a
facially neutral employment practice with discriminatory impact violated
Title VII.3" Eliminating such practices in the future, however, would not
remedy past discrimination. By rectifying imbalance attributable to prior
unlawful practices, 39 voluntary affirmative action solved a "practical prob-
lem in administration of Title VII not anticipated by Congress.
' 40
B. Underlying Models of the Legislature
Theories of interpretation do not stand in isolation. In a system based
on legislative supremacy,41 courts are subordinate to Congress.4 Therefore,
judges choosing among theories of interpretation necessarily make assump-
tions about the legislature.43 Legal scholars typically discuss three models
of legislative behavior.
Weber, 443 U.S. at 216 (Burger, J., dissenting) (refusing to join the Court's opinion because "it is con-
trary to the explicit language of the statute").
38 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,424-25 (1971).
39 See Weber, 443 U.S. at 210-11.
40 Id. at211.
41 See William N. Eskridge, Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 319, 319 (1989) ("Legis-
lative supremacy has long been a shibboleth in discourse about statutory interpretation.").
Legislative supremacy is traditionally based on the text of the Constitution and the political account-
ability of elected representatives. See U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. I ("All legislative Powers herein granted
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States."); Osbum v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 738, 866 (1824) (determining that judicial power under Article III constrains courts to giving
"effect to the will of the legislature"); Edward 0. Correia, A Legislative Conception of Legislative Sut-
premacy, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1129, 1132-39 (1992) (describing positivist and normative argu-
ments for legislative supremacy).
More generally, legislative supremacy is based on representative democracy and the rule of law. See
Schacter, supra note 3, at 594 ("The impulse to reconcile the enterprise of statutory interpretation with
the idea of legislative supremacy has a kind of primal quality and reflects the central preoccupation in
American law with constraining judicial discretion because of the fear that judicial lawmaking will
compromise democracy and undermine the rule of law."); Aleinikoff, supra note 3, at 31 ("All interpre-
tive theories must ultimately be grounded in a political theory and a theory of law, even if the interpreter
is unwilling to recognize or state the underlying premise."). For more discussion of the role of represen-
tative democracy and the rule of law in statutory interpretation, see infra notes 304-27 and accompany-
ing text.
42 See Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 283
(1989) ("Legislative supremacy, as a doctrine of statutory interpretation, is grounded in the notion that,
except when exercising the power of judicial review, courts are subordinate to legislatures."); Sunstein,
supra note 3, at 415 ("According to the most prominent conception of the role of courts in statutory con-
struction, judges are agents or servants of the legislature."). See generally Eskridge, supra note 41, at 322
(describing positive theory of legislative supremacy, under which judges act as relational agents, and nega-
tive theory of supremacy, under which judges should not violate legislative expectations).
43 See Jerry L. Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the Understanding of Public Law, 65 Cil.-
KENT L. REV. 123, 152 (1989) ("Faced with vague or ambiguous statutes the judiciary must use sonic
set of background presuppositions about legislatures and legislative behavior in order to give meaning to
statutes in a polity that is dedicated to legislative supremacy. Moreover, those background presupposi-
tions cannot safely be adopted without some positive theory of politics or the legislative process.");
Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia 's Textualism: The "'New" Legal Process, 12 CAtDOZO L. REV. 1597,
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One model is that of a rational actor. Rationality varies in intensity. At
a minimum, it requires mere intelligibility. One famous analogy compares
the legislature to a housekeeper directing a domestic to "fetch some soup-
meat.'"4 A stronger version demands the systematic pursuit of the common
good. Hart and Sacks posited that the legislature was "made up of reason-
able persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably." 45
The rational actor model supports intentionalism. Rational actors have
intent,46 and legislative history supplies reasons for legislative action.4 7 Dif-
ferent degrees of rationality support different conceptions of legislative in-
tent. Scholars inquiring into the legislature's actual understandings assume
that statutes are intelligible commands of the sovereign.48 Scholars searching
for objective purpose assume that the legislature systematically pursues the
common good, an assumption incorporated49 in the rule in Heydon 's Case.50
The second model, found in public choice theory, is that of a malfunc-
tioning machine. Public choice theory regards preferences as exogenous, or
preceding the process. This means that preexisting, usually materialistic,
1642 (1991) ("The judicial task ultimately is to make sense of the legislative producL ... (A] view of
the legislature is an essential part of giving meaning to statutes.").
44 FRANcS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLmCAL HERtENEUTiCS 17-20 (3d ed. St. Louis, F.H. Thomas
1880). Professor Eskridge has recently revived this analogy. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Fetch Some
Soupmeat, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 2209 (1995).
45 HART& SACKS, supra note 17, at 1415.
46 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Ther',
for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 275-76 (1988) (associating deference to legislative in-
tention with a view of government as reasonable persons acting reasonably); Slawson, supra note 24, at
398-99 (asserting that intent theory assumes that the legislature is a person).
47 See Brudney, supra note 3, at 79 (basing reliance on legislative history on the assumption of"rea-
sonable legislators acting reasonably").
48 See Eskridge, supra note 15, at 370 (describing nineteenth-century attitudes towards statutes).
49 See Blatt, supra note 18, at 804, 807 n.43, 811 n.68, 830-33 (tracing reliance upon rule in He).-
don's Case from Blackstone and nineteenth-century case law to its revival in the mid-twentieth century
by Max Redin, Felix Frankfurter, and Hart and Sacks).
50 3 Co. Rep. 7a, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (1584). In Heydon's Case, the Court of the Exchequer said:
[Flor the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restric-
tive or enlarging of the common law), four things are to be discerned and considered:-
1st. What was the common law before the making of the Act.
2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide.
3rd. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the
commonwealth.
And, 4th. The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all the Judges is always to
make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress
subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato commodo, and to
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objectives51 drive legislation. The legislature passively mirrors the prefer-
ences of society at large.52 Two factors, however, prevent the legislature
from reflecting society's preferences. First, some interests, most noticeably
those that are large and diffuse,53 are underrepresented in the legislative as-
sembly. Such interests have difficulty organizing because they cannot pre-
vent noncontributors from free riding upon their lobbying efforts.54 Second,
legislation sometimes does not reflect the views of the assembly. Majority
voting cannot aggregate certain preferences.
55
The malfunctioning machine model supports textualism. It casts doubt
on the coherence of legislative intent56 and the reliability of legislative his-
tory.57 It leaves statutory language as the only certain product of the legisla-
tive process.58
A third model of the legislature, developed in civic republicanism, 59 is
that of a forum for deliberation. This model treats preferences as endoge-
nous, 60 that is, as resulting from the democratic process. Individuals do not
know what they want until they engage in discussion. Accordingly, gov-
ernment plays an active role in developing preferences. Legislation is not a
51 See Edward L. Rubin, Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive Rationality in the Writing and
Reading of Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (1991) (stating that public choice theory assumes that "all
political participants... are motivated solely by the desire to maximize their material self-interest").
52 Focusing almost exclusively on re-election, legislators themselves contribute little toward articulat-
ing society's desires. See id. at 14-19 (explaining that recent public choice analyses "rest on the assumption
that legislators are motivated primarily by their desire to maximize their chance of reelection").
53 Diffusion is not the only factor causing underrepresentation. Financial capacity also has this ef-
feet. See KAY LEHMAN SCHOLZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 65-73 (1986) (noting that interest group representation is skewed toward business groups
and against those representing the less advantaged).
54 See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 165 (1965) ("[L]arge or latent groups
have no tendency voluntarily to act to further their common interests.").
55 Majority voting cannot, for example, resolve the choice between three mutually exclusive alterna-
tives voted in pairs. See ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 7, at 52 for an illustration. This is a conse-
quence of Arrow's theorem. See generally KENNETH ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL
VALUES (2d ed. 1963).
56 See Eskridge, supra note 46, at 277 (arguing that the public choice vision of the legislative proc-
ess undermines an intentionalist approach to statutory interpretation).
57 Special interests may use legislative history to bypass safeguards built into the legislative process.
See Zeppos, supra note 24, at 1304-08 (describing how public choice critique undermines use of legisla-
tive history).
58 See Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 51 ("Interest-group legislation requires adherence to the terms
of the compromise. The court cannot 'improve' on a pact that has no content other than the exact bar-
gain among the competing interests because the pact has no purpose.").
59 See Sunstein, supra note 21, at 1548-49 ("Many republican conceptions treat politics as above all
deliberative, and deliberation is to cover ends as well as means.... [E]xisting desires should be revis-
able in light of collective discussion and debate, bringing to bear alternative perspectives and additional
information.") (footnote omitted).
60 See id. at 1549 ("A central point [in republicanism] is that individual preferences should not be
treated as exogenous to politics. They are a function of existing practice.") (footnote omitted).
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flawed mirror of society at large. In fact, it plays an essential role in the de-
velopment of public values and the inculcation of civic virtue.
6 1
The forum for deliberation model supports dynamic interpretation.
62
Legislation is part of an ongoing debate over public values. That discussion
does not end with the legislative session, but continues into society at
large. 63 Courts participate in this ongoing discussion and are not limited to
materials emanating from the legislative process.
64
C. Gaps in Current Scholarship
The debate over theory exposes the "legisprudential" assumptions un-
derlying judicial opinions. At one end of the spectrum, Justice Blackmun's
Weber opinion relied on the forum for deliberation model. 65 Less dynamic
Justices, like Brennan, Breyer, and Stevens, vho routinely invoke statutory
purpose and rely on legislative history,66 presuppose reasonable persons.
Relatively textualist judges rely on other models. Seeking actual intent, Jus-
tice Rehnquist views the legislature as intelligibly aggregating pluralistic val-
ues.68 Limiting himself to text, Justice Scalia is frankly pessimistic about the
capacity of the legislative process to aggregate preferences accurately. 69
The focus on judicial attitudes,70 however, creates certain gaps in our
understanding of the legislature and judiciary. First, current scholarship
61 Seeid. at 1541.
62 See id. at 1584 (arguing that republicanism supports interpreting statutes in a way that could plau-
sibly be understood as the outcome of a deliberate process).
63 See ESKaiDGE, supra note 3, at 184 (observing that, in republicanism, "the political and social cul-
tures continuously interact in what Robert Cover calls 'jurisgenerative' (norm- or law-creating moments)").
64 See Sunstein, supra note 21, at 1582 ("[A] republican approach to statutory construction... re-
pudiates the idea that the only role of courts is to ascertain legislative intent in the particular case.").
65 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutoryfnterpretation, 137 U. PA. L REV. 1007,
1075-81 (1989) (describing Blackmun's position in W~eberas a"public values" approach).
66 See Jorge L. Carro & Andrew R. Brann, Use of Legislative Histories by the United States Su-
preme Court: A Statistical Analysis, 9 J. LEWtS. 282, 302-03 (1982) (demonstrating that Justices Bren-
nan, Blackmun, and Stevens cite legislative history more than others); Michael H. Koby, The Supreme
Court's Declining Reliance on Legislative History: The Impact ofJustice Scalla 's Critique, 36 HAPtv. J.
ON LEGIs. 371, 393 (1999) (confirming and updating prior study); William Popkin, An Internal Critique
of Justice Scalia's Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L REV. 1133, 1135 (1992) (describing
Justice Stevens's willingness to go beyond text).
67 See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History In Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL L
REv. 845, 847 n.7 (1992) (quoting HART & SACHS, supra note 17, at 1415); see also supra note 45 and
accompanying text.
6s See Thomas W. Merrill, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Pluralist Theory, and the Interpretation of Stat-
utes, 25 RUTGERS LJ. 621, 642-44 (1994) (ascribing Justice Rehnquist's focus on the deal struck by
Congress to a pluralist description of the legislature).
69 See id. at 663-66 (attributing Justice Scalia's textualism to pessimism about the legislative process).
70 See James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes: Idle
Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1, 3-4 (1994) ('Much of scholarly literature considers
statutory interpretation from a judge-centered perspective, regarding statutes as one among the various
sources of law to be interpreted and applied to particular controversies").
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oversimplifies the legislature. The debate over theory reduces legislative
behavior to a single model.' It slights the fact that Congress is a huge
institution in which elected representatives play but one role. The public
provides considerable input. Congress's deliberations are televised and its
offices are open to everyone. Furthermore, Congress has nearly twenty
thousand employees.72 Legislators live and die with elections, but many of
their employees do not. The employees often regard themselves as experts in
substantive fields.
Second, current scholarship lacks a comparative description of gov-
ernmental institutions-a common baseline by which to assess similarities
and differences. Such a baseline is necessary to choose a theory of interpre-
tation. Courts interpreting statutes do not just adopt a model of the legisla-
ture; they also make assumptions about judicial behavior. 73  The
malfunctioning machine model supports textualism only if judges cannot
adjust for deficiencies in the legislative process. 74 Similarly, the forum for
the deliberation model supports best answer only if judges are viewed as
participants in deliberation.
71 See, e.g., Richard Pildes & Elizabeth Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice
Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2121 (1990); Rubin, Beyond
Public Choice, supra note 51, at 55 (comparing public choice and comprehensive rationality as descrip-
tions of legislative behavior and as a basis for interpretive theory); Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public
Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the
1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1990) (comparing public interest and public choice theories of legislation).
72 See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1990, at 323
(1990) (stating that in 1989, Congress had 19,504 employees).
73 See Schacter, supra note 3, at 593-94 (arguing that to interpret a statute, a "court must adopt-at
least implicitly-a theory about its own role by ... taking an institutional stance in relation to the legis-
lature."); cf Jerry Mashaw, As If Republican Interpretation, 97 YALE L.J. 1685, 1690-94 (1988) (criti-
cizing republicanism for neglecting the role of the interpreter).
74 See Eskridge, supra note 46, at 314-15 (noting that the inferences drawn from public choice the-
ory differ according to one's assumptions); Rubin, supra note 51, at 46 (describing the spectrum of in-
terpretive theories based upon an interest group politics description of the legislative process).
Superior judicial capacity might justify an inquiry into intent or best answer. Professors Farber and
Frickey argue that public choice theory is consistent with an inquiry into legislative intent. See Daniel
A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 423, 461-65 (1988)
(describing a pragmatic approach to legislative intent that is consistent with public choice theory). Pro-
fessor Macey goes further and argues that, notwithstanding the role of interest group bargains in legisla-
tion, courts should nonetheless interpret statutes as public regarding. See Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting
Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM.
L. REv. 223, 250-55 (1986) (defending the traditional approach to statutory interpretation as reducing
the quantity of private interest legislation).
75 Although modem republicans assume that judges participate in deliberation, that assumption was
not shared by early republicans, who were suspicious ofjudicial review. See Sunstein, supra note 21, at
1556. Even Sunstein and Eskridge disagree over whether public values can supersede ordinary interpre-
tation. See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 411 n.21 (criticizing Eskridge's assumption that public values are
independent of ordinary interpretation).
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II. INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES AND CURRENT SCHOLARSHIP
A. The Policy, Political, and Public Communities
There are, however, richer accounts of institutions than those offered in
the current debate. Astute students of government have long recognized
that government involves three basic groups. In 1939, Karl Llewellyn de-
scribed the working constitution by reference to specialists in governing, in-
terested groups, and the general public.76 Fifty years later, John Kingdon
provided substantial empirical verification for this taxonomy. Conducting
247 interviews with Washington insiders, Kingdon identified three sepa-
rate streams-policy, political, and problem-feeding into governmental
decisions.78
Llewellyn and Kingdon's work dovetails with Stanley Fish's concept
of an interpretive community, which constitutes a shared point of view as
much as a group of individuals. 79 These communities comprise ideal
types-intellectual constructs that reflect widespread phenomena, but that
do not exist in pure form.80 Their use is justified not by some ultimate truth
but by the insights they generate.8 ' Llewellyn and Kingdon's work points
to three interpretive communities, which comprise both the author and the
76 See Karl N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUNM. L RE%. I, 19 (1934).
77 See JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 220 (1984). These in-
terviews were with congressional staff, executive department personnel, journalists, consultants, aca-
demics, and researchers. Id. at 221.
78 See id. at 92.
79 According to Stanley Fish, an interpretive community is:
not so much a group of individuals who shared a point of view, but a point of view or way of orga-
nizing experience that shared individuals in the sense that its assumed distinctions, categories of
understanding, and stipulations of relevance and irrelevance were the content of the consciousness
of community members who were therefore no longer individuals, but, insofar as they were em-
bedded in the community's enterprise, community property.
FISH, NATURALLY, supra note 1, at 141.
80 See CARL G. HMPEL, ASPECTs OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION 156 (1965). Max Wcber intro-
duced this term. See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 19-22 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich
eds., 1978); see also Llewellyn, Constitution as Institution, supra note 76, at 20 n.32 ("[A]II that is in-
tended by the use of such terms, unqualified, is, throughout this paper, twofold: first (and descriptively)
that in significantly high measure the attributes of the concept are present in the life around us; second
(and theoretically) that any increasing quantum of their presence or of their range or intensity vwhere pre-
sent would strengthen the truth-value of the proposition announced concerning them.").
81 See HENiPEL, supra note 80, at 156; Llewellyn, supra note 76, at 20 n.32 ("the marking off of 'an
interest,' 'a group,' 'an institution' is an artificial abstraction from a complexly concrete mass of phe-
nomena... [and] the boundaries drawn will always be indefcsible, save for as they become useful and
significantfor thepurpose in hand."). The policy, political, and public communities are not the -only"
or "true" communities involved in statutory interpretation. The only claim here is that this grouping
generates useful insights.
95:629 (2001)
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
audience for statutes. These communities are each described by a different
model8 2 (see chart below).
THE DYNAMICS OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES
Policy Political Public
(Specialized Professionals) (Politicians) (Generalists)
Reasoned Argument Bargaining and Reaction Based on
Voting Cultural Archetypes
Rational Actor Malfunctioning Forum for
Machine Deliberation
The first community, the policy community, consists of professionals
with specialized substantive knowledge. Members of this community work
in administrative agencies, congressional offices, universities, and some-
times, lobbying groups. The policy community comprises the hidden actors
in government. Sharing specialized understandings, the policy community
strives for consensus through reasoned argument.
8f
The policy community consists of separate subcommunities, depending
upon the substantive area. There are as many subcommunities as there are
subjects. Different communities form around subjects, such as the envi-
ronment, corporate securities, communications, and taxation. The commu-
nities vary considerably as to their coherence and structure. Taxation, for
example, is the province of a relatively small cadre of lawyers and econo-
mists concentrated in the Treasury Department and the staffs of the tax writ-
ing committees. Environmental law involves a cross section of scientific
specialties, dispersed among an array of departments and committees.84
The policy community relies on formal reasoning.
85
82 Kingdon's problem stream consists of value judgments drawn from the larger culture. See
KINGDON, supra note 77, at 116-17.
83 See id. at 122-51.
84 See CELIA CAMPBELL-MOHN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: FROM RESOURCES TO RECOVERY
79-80 (1993) (identifying 17 federal agencies with environmental law responsibilities and attributing
this division to fragmented congressional committees).
85 For various descriptions of policy analysis, see, for example, GARY D. BREWER & PETER DE
LEON, THE FOUNDATIONS OF POLICY ANALYSIS 33, 83, 179 (1983) (recognition of problem, identifica-
tion of problem context, determination of goals and objectives, and generation of alternatives, estimation
of alternatives, and selection); MELVIN J. DUBNICK & BARBARA BARDES, THINKING ABOUT PUBLIC
POLICY: A PROBLEM-SOLVING APPROACH 168 (1983) (defining the problem, analyzing the problem, estab-
lishing a goal or objective, developing alternative solutions, analyzing the alternatives, selecting the "best
alternatives" and evaluating the chosen alternative once selected); E.S. QUADE, ANALYSIS FOR PUBLIC
DECISIONS 45-47 (1989) (decision maker should consider the objectives of the decision, the alternatives
available for attaining the objectives, the impact of the alternatives, the criteria for ranking the alterna-
tives, and the model for predicting the consequences of the alternatives); EDITH STOKEY & RICHARD
ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 5-6 (1978) (establishing the context, laying out the altema-
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The legal profession itself is one policy subcommunity. Lawyers and
judges86 are hidden actors who claim specialized knowledge.87  Trained in
law school and legal practice,88 this community often reasons from analogy.89
The policy community is described by the rational actor model, espe-
cially in its strong form. That community views itself as pursuing reason-
able ends reasonably.90 By selecting the best means for arriving at a given
goal, the rational analysis favored by this community mimics the rule in
Heydon's Case. Hart and Sacks's willingness to impute rationality to the
legislature was likely influenced by the proliferation of policy communities
after the New Deal.
The dynamics of the policy community insulate it from the difficulties
predicted by public choice theory. Reaching agreement through persuasion
instead of voting, this community is less subject to Arrow's Theorem.
9 1
Furthermore, this community is largely immune from the free rider effect.
tives, predicting the consequences, valuing the outcomes, making a choice); DmOmttA A. STONE, POLICY
PARADOX AND POLITICAL REASON 185 (1988) (goal determination, canvassing of available alternatives,
evaluation of the alternatives, and selection of the alternative most likely to reach the goal).
86 See Owen M. Fiss, Comments on Conventionalism, 58 S. CAL L REV. 177, 177-78 (1985) (ac-
knowledging that a "judge is a thoroughly socialized member ofa profession").
87 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Non-Legal 77cory in Judicial Dccisionmaking, 17 HARV. J.L PuB.
POL'Y 87, 88 (1994) (arguing that American law cannot be rcduccd to any other discipline, nor can legal
analysis be reduced to any other methodology); Charles Fried, The Artjficlal Reason of the Lint, or:
What Lawyers Know, 60 TEX. L. REV. 35, 38 (1981) ("[\V]hat judges are expert at, is, not surprisingly,
the law... [T]he law is a distinct subject, a branch neither of economics nor of moral philosophy, and
that it is in that subject that judges and lawyers are expert; it is that subject which law professors should
expound and law students study.").
88 See generally Andrew Goldsmith, Is There Any Backbone in 77Tis Fish? Interpretive Communi-
ties, Social Criticism, and Transgressive Legal Practice, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 373 (1998) (analyz-
ing the interpretive community of practicing lawyers).
89 See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
362 (1993) ("What lawyers are particularly trained to do and can generally do better than philosophers
and economists is think about cases .... The ability to fashion hypothetical cases and empathically to
explore both real and invented ones is the lawyer's professional forte."); EDWARD H. LEVI, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1-2 (1949) (describing legal reasoning as analogical); Fried, su-
pra note 87, at 57 ("Analogy and precedent are the stuff of the law because they are the only form of
reasoning left to the law when general philosophical structures and deductive reasoning give out, over-
whelmed by the mass of particular details."); Cass R. Sunstein, 106 HAR\V. L REV. 741, 741 (1993)
("Reasoning by analogy is the most familiar form oflegal reasoning."). Other disciplines rely more on
the "top-down" theories. See Fried, supra note 87, at 57 (distinguishing law from philosophy); Sunstein,
supra, at 749-50 (distinguishing legal reasoning from "top-down" theories, which apply general princi-
ples to particular cases). Others still rely on the ends-means reasoning. See Fried, supra note 87, at 46
(concluding that legal concepts cannot be reduced to economic discourse); Sunstein, On Analogical
Reasoning, supra, at 758 (distinguishing legal reasoning from ends-means rationality).
90 "Reasonableness," is used descriptively here to refer to a particular way of making decisions. This
method for making decisions is not necessarily better or more accurate than others.
91 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L REv. 802, 825-29 (1982)
(explaining that Arrow's Theorem only applies if there is a range ofadmissible choices).
95:629 (2001)
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Relatively unconcerned with material self-interest, the community is less
moved by group pressure.92
The second community is the political community. This community
consists of the elected politicians and their consultants, who each respond to
electoral, partisan, or pressure group factors. Politicians reach out to voters,
debate opposing politicians, and court interest groups. Members of this
community comprise the visible actors in government: the President and
his administration, political appointees, members of Congress, and political
parties. The political community reaches consensus by bargaining rather
than persuasion. Voting is crucial. Its members trade provisions, build coa-
litions, and compromise.
93
The machine model most accurately conveys the self-understanding of
the political community. That community consciously responds to exogenous
preferences. Elected politicians focus on re-election and undertake strategic
actions designed to enhance their personal power. Their substantive positions
derive from constituents-organized interest groups or political parties.
The third community, the public community, 94 consists of society at
large, persons lacking a special role in government. The public community
is the largest and most heterogeneous community. Its members usually
don't know and don't care about legislation. They usually react instinc-
tively, drawing conclusions from unquestioned images and symbols. 95 On
rare occasions, segments of the public community actively mobilize for so-
cial change.
96
Core elements of the forum for the deliberation model resonate with
the public community. Public preferences are typically endogenous, emerg-
ing only through a process, such as polling or legislation. By contrast, the
policy community begins from preexisting goals like efficiency and equity
and focuses on the best means for achieving them.97 Furthermore, civic vir-
tue develops in the public community, not among policy elites.
92 See Rubin, supra note 51, at 47 (arguing that judges do not engage in self-interested behavior).
93 See KINGDON, supra note 77, at 152-72.
94 Kingdon's third "stream" is the "problem stream." This stream, however, is formed largely by
judgments from society at large. See id. at 115.
95 See, e.g., MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS 5 (Illini Books ed. 1985) ("For
most men most of the time, politics is a series of pictures in the mind, placed there by television news,
newspapers, magazines, and discussions. The pictures create a moving panorama taking place in a
world the mass public never quite touches, yet one its members come to fear or cheer, often with passion
and sometimes with action.").
96 See James Gray Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in the American
Constitutional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 287 (1990).
97 Admittedly, this analysis does not proceed as orderly as sometimes claimed. See Charles E. Lind-
blom, The Science of "Muddling Through," 19 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 79, 82 (1959) ("[E]valuation and em-
pirical analysis are intertwined; that is, one chooses among values and among policies at one and the same
time.").
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Other aspects of the forum for deliberation model resonate with the
policy community. That community engages in hands-on, day-to-day issues
of governance. Public participation is largely restricted to occasional large-
scale social movements, culminating in "constitutional moments."9g Fur-
thermore, the policy community deliberates more deeply. By contrast, the
public community typically reacts instinctively. It does not probe and re-
consider its position.
Each community has its own sphere of influence in government. The
public community exerts the greatest influence over the agenda, the list of
subjects to which persons in government pay attention.99 Action requires
perception of a public problem. 00 The policy community has the greatest
influence over the specification of alternatives. This community has princi-
pal responsibility for drafting legislation.' 0t The political community oper-
ates in both realms, influencing both proposals and agendas.
The relative contributions of the communities may vary from subject to
subject. The policy community plays a large role in technical areas like tax,
where the sheer density of the statute and the importance of specialized
knowledge reduce access from other communities.0 2 The political com-
munity dominates more accessible areas such as tariffs, in which there are
obvious winners and losers.10 3 The public community has more impact on
98 See BRUCE ACKERNAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6 (1991); Cass R. Sunstein, Legislative
Foreword: Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN. L REV. 247, 254
n.23 (1996) (describing the idea of a constitutional moment as "a metaphor, connoting large-scale
change spurred by popular wishes").
99 See KINGDON, supra note 77, at 3-4 (distinguishing agenda setting from alternative specification).
100 See id. at 95-121. A condition becomes a problem only if there is a shared cultural judgment
that something must be done. A focusing event-a disaster, crisis, or powerful symbol-provides the
occasion for expressing this judgment. See ROGER W. COBB & CHARLES D. ELDER, PARTICIPATION IN
AMERICAN POLITICS: THE DYNAMICS OF AGENDA-BUILDING 172-73 (2d ed. 1983) ("Policy problems
are socially constructed. They arise not so much from events and circumstances as from the meanings
that people attribute to events and circumstances.").
1ot See Zeppos, supra note 24, at 1313 ("Virtually no members of Congress draft their own legislation.
Rather, that task is left to committee staff, the Office of Legislative Counsel, or lobbyists."). The Office of
Legislative Counsel drafts a huge number of bills. See KENNETH KOBIEIIL, PROFESSIONAL STAFFS OF
CONGRESS 194 (3d ed. 1977) (observing that the combined total drafting assignments performed by House
and Senate legislative counsel offices numbered over 6,000 in 1952).
102 Members of the tax-writing committees do not vote on statutory language and the nonpartisan
staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation drafts committee reports. See Michael Livingston, Congress,
the Courts and the Code: Legislative History and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 69 TEX. L REV.
819,833, 838 (1991).
103 For a classic study of the politics endemic to tariff legislation, see ELiER E. SCIATTSCHNEIDER,
POLITICS, PRESSURES AND THE TARIFF: A STUDY OF FREE PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN PRESSURE POLITICS
AS SHOWN INTHE 1929-1930 REvISION OFTHE TARIFF (1935).
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high profile issues such as civil rights, on which almost everyone has an
opinion't 4 (see chart below).
Tax Tariffs Civil Rights
PolcyPolcyPolicy Politics
Poiy Politics r r- Politics
Pulc Public Public
B. Interpretive Communities in Government
A recognition of interpretive communities fills some gaps in current
scholarship. That acknowledges the diversity of the legislature by revealing
that Congress is the meeting place of all three communities. The public
community forms the backdrop against which Congress operates, 10 5 exercis-
ing its influence through polls and elections. The political community
dominates representatives and their personal staffs. A representative's per-
sonal staff is headed by an administrative assistant, who usually has politi-
cal experience in the home district or state'06 and hires staff with campaign
experience.107  The policy community is represented in the professional
staff. The Office of Legislative Counsel, for example, is an apolitical108 bu-
reaucracy that hires directly from law school °9 and promotes from
104 Public opinion polls are frequently taken in such areas. A Westlaw search conducted on No-
vember 14, 2000 in the poll database in DIALOGUE shows 901 citations to "civil rights," compared to
207 citations to "tariffs," and 79 citations to "taxation." See infra notes 241-42.
105 See Llewellyn, supra note 76, at 19 (noting that the public plays a role like that of an audience in
a theater).
106 See HARRISON W. Fox, JR. & SUSAN WEBB HAMMOND, CONGRESSIONAL STAFFS: Ttle
INVISIBLE FORCE IN AMERICAN LAWMAKING 40 (1977) ("Of the AA's, 59 percent had worked in district
or state politics prior to Hill employment; indeed, in many cases, it was because of this involvement that
the AA was invited to Washington as an employee.").
307 See id. ("A majority of the [personal] staff members, 55 percent, in the survey had been active in
politics prior to coming to the Hill.").
108 See KOFMEHL, supra note 101, at 185 ("In accordance with the organic law of the Office, ap-
pointments were made without reference to political affiliations. In fact, if a candidate had been promi-
nently identified with political activities, he was automatically disqualified.").
109 See id. ("[T]he legislative counsel generally followed the practice ofappointing young men who
had just graduated from law school and been admitted to the bar.").
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within. n0 Likewise, professional training"' and executive branch experi-
ence 12 link committee staff to the policy community.
Legislation involves all three communities, 13 not just the political one.




generally demands that legislation have a veneer of public benefit. Even
industry specific subsidies are couched in terms acceptable to the entire
country. Advocates of agricultural subsidies, for example, usually appeal to
the plight of the family farm,' 15 a powerful symbol in American culture.
16
On the other hand, legislation will not proceed without a credible solu-
tion, "17 a component that requires policy consensus.
The role of the communities in legislation is illustrated by the statute at
issue in Weber-the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The public community
placed the bill on the legislative agenda. Mass movements led by civil
rights and religious groups focused attention on civil rights."18 The political
community affected both the timetable for enactment and the substance of
the legislation. Politicians scheduled the bill for legislative consideration'9
and engaged in the bargaining and negotiations necessary for the bill to be-
110 See id. (observing that after a probationary period, assistants in legislative counsel office had "in
effect permanent tenure," that vacancies were filled from the bottom rung, and that there vas a remark-
able continuity in the staff, with several senior staffers serving two decades or more).
I See Fox & HAiMOND, supra note 106, at 44 ("Committee aides are highly trained sp.cialists.
Law is the predominant field, and nearly half of all committee professionals hold legal degrees.");
KOFMEHL, supra note 101, at 84 (observing that educational background of professional staff compares
favorably with that of employees in executive branch and other segments of congressional staf!).
112 See Fox & HAMMOND, supra note 106, at 45 (noting that executive branch work is the most
usual path to committee appointment); KOFMEHL, supra note 101, at 84 (observing that the educational
background of professional staff compares favorably with that of employees in the executive branch and
other segments of congressional staff).
113 See KINGDON, supra note 77, at 211 ("The probability of an item rising on a decision agenda is
dramatically increased if all three elements-problem, policy proposal, and political rcceptivity-are
linked in single package."); see also Llewellyn, supra note 76, at 18 (describing the working Constitu-
tion as embracing "the interlocking ways and attitudes of different groups and classes in the commu-
nity--dfferent ways and attitudes of different groups and classes, but all cogging together into a fairly
well organized whole").
114 See generally McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positivo Political Thcory in Statutoty
Interpretation, 57 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1994) (describing "vetogates" through w'hich legislation
must pass to be enacted).
,15 See generally INGOLF VOGELER, THE MYTH OF THE FAMILY FARM.|: AGRIBUSINESS DOINANCE
OF U.S. AGRICULTURE (1981).
116 The family farm served as the prototype for the American dream ofsuccess through hard work. Sce
REx BURNS, SUCCESS IN AMmuCA: THE YEOMAN DREAM AND THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION (1976);
PETER D'A. JONES, THE CONSUMER SOCIETY: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM 100 (1965); JOwN
MICKEL WILLIAMS, OUR RURAL HERITAGE 83 (1925).
117 See KINGDON, supra note 77, at 150 (describing the need for a viable alternative before govern-
ment acts).
118 See ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 7, at 2-3 (describing political protests as inspinng intro-
duction of the civil rights bill).
"19 See id. at 8-9 (describing how the civil rights bill was delayed for the Kennedy tax cut bill).
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come law. 120 Finally, the policy community provided statutory language
and technical expertise. Government lawyers drafted the administration
bill, redrafted the house version, t21 and prepared the briefing book used on
the floor of the House of Representatives.
Issues arise at different levels in the legislative process. Some high
profile issues are central to public understanding. For example, the public
clearly expected that the Civil Rights Act would overturn Jim Crow. Other
issues pertain to political deals cut on behalf of organized groups. The bur-
den borne by employers and unions was brokered by politicians. Still other
issues fall below the political radar screen and are left for resolution by the
policy community. 23 Rules of procedure and administration fall within this
category.
An appreciation of interpretive communities not only acknowledges
the diversity of the legislature, it also provides a comparative description of
the branches of government. The legislature is particularly responsive to
the public and political communities. Elections give the public power, and
voting on bills facilitates the weighing of competing preferences.
The executive is less responsive to these communities. Although the
President is an elected official, the policy community dominates the admin-
istrative agencies. The President can influence only a few programs 124 and
cannot direct details. 25 This dominance is based on numbers and exper-
tise. 26  Only 3,100 of the three million executive employees are political
120 See id. at 20-22 (describing negotiations between Senators Humphrey and Dirksen),
121 See CHARLES & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TIlE
1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 93 (1985) ("'[S]taff people on the Judiciary Committee participated in redraft-
ing this bill, [and] duly constituted and appointed and confirmed people in the Department of Justice
helped write the bill, the same general people who often help in writing difficult and technical bills
which are considered by the Judiciary Committee.") (second alteration in original) (quoting William
McCulloch, ranking member of the House Judiciary Committee).
122 See ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 7, at 14-15 (explaining that Justice Department attorneys
prepared the briefing book and stood by for assistance).
123 See Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 17 ("Most statutes are interest-group compromises only in part,
and the question is, 'Which part?' . . . A court sensitive to these things must start with the bargaining
behind the statute but cannot stop there. This is not the place, though, for a map of the journey it must
take.").
124 See WILLIAM P. BROWNE, POLITICS, PROGRAMS, AND BUREAUCRATS 161 (1980) ("The person
who occupies the White House is not the 'civics book president' exerting personal influence on a vast
array of public programs. Any president's influence is limited to a few key programs.... Chief exccu-
tives accept most programs on face value and approve them just as they were developed and submitted
by bureaus.").
125 See id.
126 See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth
Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 586 (1984) ("As Presidents and political scientists are fond of remarking,
the White House does not control policymaking in the executive departments. The President and a few
hundred political appointees are at the apex of an enormous bureaucracy whose members enjoy tenure in
their jobs, are subject to the constraints of statutes whose history and provisions they know in detail, and
often have strong views of the public good in the field in which they work.') (citations omitted).
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appointees,127 and bureaucrats possess specialized knowledge that con-
strains those appointees.
1 28
The judiciary is most insulated from the public and policy communi-
ties. Life tenure, a hierarchy of courts, written opinions, and a leisurely
process all promote rational decision making. Judges aspire to reasoned
elaboration, not bargaining or gut reaction.
2 9
C. The Effect of Communities on Statutory Interpretation
Cutting across institutions, the interpretive community account bridges
positions in the debate over the appropriate theory of interpretation. As
members of a particular policy community, judges encounter legislative
product emanating from all three communities, each presenting a distinct
interpretive challenge and range of options (see chart below). By providing
a context for assessing competing claims about the legislature,' 0 the inter-
pretive community account grounds the intuition that different statutes'
3 1
deserve different theories of interpretation.
32
There is no simple one-to-one correspondence between the responsible
community and the theory of interpretation chosen by judges. Judges typi-
cally draw on two or more theories. 33 Community involvement does, how-
ever, affect the relative weight given each theory. Thus, the center of
127 These belong to schedule C of the excepted service, noncareer senior executives, and the execu-
tive schedule. See KENNETH J. MEIER, POLITICS AND THE BUREAUCRACY: POLiCYMAKINO IN THE
FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 38-39 (3d ed. 1993). Ninety percent of executive employees are
part of the career civil service or another merit system.
128 See, e.g., William D. Berry, An Alternative to the Capture Theory of Regulation: The Case of
State Public Utility Commissions, 28 Art. J. POL SCI. 524 (1984); William D. Berry, Utility Regulation
in the States: The Policy Effects of Professionalism and Salience to the Consumer, 23 AJ. J. POL SCL.
263 (1979).
129 See ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & CHARLES 0. PORTER, THE AMIERICAN LAWYER 269 (1954); LoN
L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW ch. 2 (rev. ed. 1964).
130 See Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Scalia's Democratic Formalism, 107 YALE LJ. 529, .540.41
(1997) (arguing that abstract and a priori claims do not support a distinctive interpretive approach,
"which must be defended by a set of pragmatic and empirical claims about various govemmental institu-
tions and how those institutions are likely to respond to different interpretive strategies.... The most
basic point is that no context-free view of legal interpretation will make much sense.").
131 See Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 16 (distinguishing general interest laws, deserving a broad
reading, from private interest laws, which should be narrowed); Richard A. Posner, Economies. Politics,
and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 269-72 (1982) (dividing stat-
utes between public interest (economically defined), public interest in other senses, public sentiment,
and narrow interest group legislation).
132 See Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 14-15 (identifying two different styles of interpretation: one in
which the court attributes a purpose to the statute; the other in which it treats the statute like a contract);
see also Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 463 U.S. 582, 641 n.12 (1983) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (recognizing that courts interpret some general, sweeping statutes "by developing legal rules
on a case-by-case basis in the common-law tradition").
133 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reason-
ing, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321,348 (1990) (arguing that courts draw from multiple theories).
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gravity among theories varies depending upon the community responsible
for the issue.
INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES AND STYLES OF INTERPRETATION
Policy Political Public
Review of Contract Interpretation Constitutional
Agency Decisions Construction
Replicate Implement Will Read Freely or
Reasoning or of Parties or Police the Adhere to
Assure Rationality Process Professional Norms
Purpose Actual Intent/Text Best Answer
1. The Policy Community and Review of Agency Decisions. Courts
discern the views of a policy community by engaging in distinctive reason-
ing, usually policy analysis. An ongoing life and shared commitment to a
rational discourse based upon specialized knowledge make the policy per-
spective theoretically accessible to those who can reproduce its reasoning.
However, the importance of specialized knowledge to this community cre-
ates a practical barrier for persons lacking such knowledge.
For issues emanating from the policy community, judges can replicate
the reasoning underlying the statutory provision-an approach that permits
them to fill necessary gaps.134 Failing that, courts can at least adopt an in-
telligible reading. Thus, the challenge is similar to that encountered in re-
viewing agency actions, where courts exercise anything from independent
judgment to rational basis review.
This challenge affects the weight given to each theory of interpretation.
On the one hand, the policy community's specialized reasoning provides a
common foundation for determining the best answer. On the other hand,
the policy community lacks power over the agenda. That community
claims authority only insofar as its proposals are enacted. Consequently,
statutory purpose is the center of gravity for issues emanating from the pol-
icy community.
35
The willingness of courts to engage in policy analysis is influenced by
the proximity of the particular policy discourse to traditional legal expertise.
134 See Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 14 (describing interpretive style, in which "the judge starts
with the statute, attributes to it certain purposes (evils to be addressed), and then brings within the statute
the class of activities that produce the same or similar objectionable results. The statute's reach goes on
expanding so long as there are unredressed objectionable results. The judge interprets omissions and
vague terms in the statute as evidence of want of time or foresight and fills in these gaps with more in
the same vein.").
133 Hart and Sacks recognized that policy analysis must be linked to text. See HART & SACKS, su.
pra note 17, at 1411 ("The words of the statute are what the legislature has enacted as law, and all that it
has the power to enact. Unenacted intentions or wishes cannot be given effect as law.").
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The closer the policy discourse is to legal expertise, the more likely it is that
the court will inquire deeply into the substantive result. For core legal ar-
eas, namely, rules of procedure 36 and evidence, courts exercise independ-
ent judgment. 137 Lawyers are society's sole experts in those areas. A court
writing on such topics may ultimately rely on textual language, but if it
does so, it is because it believes text itself provides the best answer, not out
of respect for the legislature. Lawyers have long recognized that reliance
on text, like other rule-like approaches, curbs official caprice, conserves ju-
dicial resources, and provides guidance to private actors.
The judicial confidence in core legal areas is illustrated by Justices
Marshall and Stevens's opinions in United States v. Locke. 39 The statute in
that case required that certain holders of mining claims against federal land
file documents with the Bureau of Land Management or be treated as hav-
ing abandoned their claims. The issue before the Court was whether statu-
tory language requiring a filing "before December 31" disallowed a filing
made on that date. Although ultimately disagreeing on this issue, Justices
Marshall and Stevens both found the issue to be within judicial expertise.
Exercising independent judgment, they each opined on the substantive na-
ture of the rule. Each also invoked statutory purpose, albeit defining it quite
differently. 140 Disallowing the filing, Justice Marshall pointed to the policy
underlying clear rules. He argued that "the purpose of a filing deadline
would be just as well served by nearly any date a court might choose as by
the date Congress has in fact set out in the statute .... '[D]eadlines are in-
herently arbitrary,' while fixed dates 'are often essential to accomplish nec-
essary results."",14' In his dissent, Justice Stevens, too, appealed to
136 See Siegel, supra note 5, at 1024 (claiming that background principles of administrative law are
a dominant force in construing many administrative statutes).
137 See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutor)' Construction and Judi-
cial Preferences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 647, 659 (1992) ("When judges are certain about the policy conse-
quences of their decisions, their confidence with respect to their predictive capabilities will enable them
to decide cases on the basis ofpublic policy.").
138 See, ag., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L
REV. 1685, 1687-1701 (1976).
139 471 U.S. 84 (1985).
140 Justice Marshall was arguably insufficiently sensitive to differences between judicial and statu-
tory deadlines. Unlike a court-ordered filing date, the deadline in Locke wvas not directly communicated
to the parties, who relied on erroneous information from an agency employee. Sce 471 U.S. at 89-90,
n.7. Thus, the case for textual reading is weaker than for a court-ordered date; cf. Fed. Crop Ins. Corp.
v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 387 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("To my mind, it is an absurdity to hold
that every farmer who insures his crops knows what the Federal Register contains or even knovs that
there is such a publication. If he were to peruse this voluminous and dull publication as it is issued from
time to time in order to make sure whether anything has been promulgated that affects his rights, he
would never need crop insurance, for he would never get time to plant any crops.").
141 Locke, 471 U.S. at 93-94 (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241,
249 (1984)).
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purpose. 42 He believed that the date in the statute was an "error," lacking
"any rational basis,' '0 43 which the agency could have corrected by regula-
tion144 and which Congress would have changed had "its attention been fo-
cused on this precise issue."'
' 45
Further afield from core legal expertise are common law subjects such
as contracts and torts. Although they lack unique expertise, courts nonethe-
less have abundant experience in such areas. 14  Accordingly, courts some-
times interpret statutes governing contracts and torts as developments of the
common law.
147
An example of this tendency is Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of California, 14
which read the Califomia Civil Code 49 to permit comparative negligence.
Admitting that the enacting (1870) legislature contemplated only the de-
fense of contributory negligence (modified by the last clear chance doc-
trine), the majority nonetheless read the statute to conform with the
evolving common law.'50 Although the legislature normally makes such
modifications, the majority believed that the judiciary could do so as
well.15' The dissent expressed less confidence about the capacity of judges
to make these judgments.
52
Still further afield are subjects that lawyers do not routinely master
pursuant to their legal training. Largely a product of the regulatory state,
these subjects include antitrust, environmental law, bankruptcy, patents, and
taxation. Judges who master these areas often engage in purposive interpre-
tation. For example, the willingness of usually textualist Judges Posner and
142 Id. at 120 (claiming that the December 31 filing was "entirely consistent with the statutory pur-
poses").
143 Id. at 123.
144 Id. at 122-23 ("If the Bureau had issued regulations expressly stating that a December 31 filing
would be considered timely.., it is inconceivable that anyone would question the validity of its regula-
tion.").
145 Id. at 125.
146 See Fried, supra note 87, at 39 (illustrating law's autonomy by reference to the law governing
contract, tort, and restitution).
147 Such development is not necessarily confined to common law subjects. See Guardian 's Ass'n,
463 U.S. at 641 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Congress phrased some older statutes in sweeping, gen-
eral terms, expecting the federal courts to interpret them by developing legal rules on a case-by-case ba-
sis in the common-law tradition.").
148 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975).
149 Section 1714 of the California Civil Code provides that: "Everyone is responsible, not only for
the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want ofordinary care or
skill in the management of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of
ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself"
15o Li, 532 P.2d at 1243.
"' Id. at 1233 ("[Ilt was the intention of the Legislature to announce and formulate existing com-
mon law principles and definitions.., with a distinct view toward continuing judicial evolution.").
152 Id. at 1247 (Clark, J. dissenting) ("[T]he Legislature is the branch best able to effect transition
from contributory negligence to comparative or some other doctrine of negligence.").
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Easterbrook to engage in substantive interpretation of antitrust laws153 is
likely influenced by their mastery of law and economics. Judges lacking
such knowledge are less likely to engage in substantive interpretation's and
are more likely to assure minimal rationality by alternative means.
One alternative relies on administrative interpretation. This approach
is perhaps most evident in environmental law. Two famous deference
cases, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRD, Inc. 155 and Chevron,
involved environmental regulation. Professor Farber suggests that the
Court deliberately minimizes its influence in this area.
156
Another way of assuring minimal rationality is by relying on statutory
text, 157 an approach often taken in bankruptcy 158 and tax. 5' One example is
Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. 60 In that case,
the Supreme Court held that the term "capital asset" included property held
for business reasons. In doing so, it relied on statutory language that enu-
merated only five exceptions. This refusal to recognize an extrastatutory
exception was a reasonable construction of text, although it was inconsis-
tent with specialized understanding.1
62
153 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFOR.1 278 (1985) (approving
interpretations of the Sherman Act that depart from statutory language); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes*
Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 533, 544 (1983) ("The statute books are full of laws, of which the
Sherman Act is a good example, that effectively authorize courts to create new lines of common law.").
154 See Daniel A. Farber, Is the Supreme Court Irrelevant? Refcctilons on the Judicial Role in E&zi-
ronmental Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 547, 547-48 (1997) ('During the past twenty years, the Court's decisions
have not substantially affected environmental regulation."); id. at 549 n.7 (suggesting that similar tendency
may occur in other technical areas such as tax or regulation of telecommunications and transportation).
tss 435 U.S. 519, 543 (1978) ("Absent constitutional constraints or extremely compelling circum-
stances.., agencies 'should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure."') (reviewing an agency
decision to prepare an environmental impact statement).
156 See Farber, supra note 154, at 549 ("[Tihe Court behaves almost as if it had deliberately under-
taken to minimize its own influence on environmental law.").
157 See Macey & Miller, supra note 137, at 658 (claiming that most cases invoking plain meaning
"are difficult and highly technical, and do not deal with subject areas that fall within the particular
expertise of any of the justices").
158 See ESKRIDGE & FIucKEY, supra note 7, at 630-31 (exploring the admission by two nontextual-
ists that in a complex area like bankruptcy, they might adhere to text and defer to those with more exper-
tise: "Only after gaining greater familiarity and confidence with the bankruptcy code and the policy
issues associated with it might we become more venturesome interpreters."); Robert K. Rasmussen, A
Study of the Costs and Benefits of Textualism: The Supreme Court's Bankruptcy Cases, 71 WASI. U.
L.Q. 535, 597 (1993) (presenting an argument for textualism in bankruptcy cases that recognizes that the
Supreme Court cases "evince little knowledge about bankruptcy policy").
159 Cf. Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don't Let Your Babies Grow Up to Be Tax Latyers,
13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 525 (1994) (describing Supreme Court aversion to tax issues).
160 485 U.S. 212 (1988).
161 Id. at 217-18.
162 The extrastatutoy exception the court struck down in Arkansas Best had a long lineage. Created
by the Supreme Court, see Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Comm'r, 350 U.S. 46 (1955) (denying capital asset
treatment to business property), the exception underlay IRS rulings and congressional statutes. See Rev.
Rul. 72-179, 1972-1 C.B. 57 (applying Corn Products); I.R.C. 1256(e)(2)(b) (1999) (statutory provision
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2. The Political Community and Interpretation of Contracts. Courts
have great difficulty discovering the views of the political community.
163
That community lacks a mode of reasoning reproducible by outsiders, and
courts in particular are insulated from its electoral, partisan, and interest
group influences. Furthermore, because a political compromise is highly
sensitive to historical conditions, it is uncertain whether even the political
community could later replicate a given deal. Thus, for issues emanating
from the political community, judges face a challenge similar to that pre-
sented in interpreting a contract. 164 Unable to reach conclusions about sub-
stantive results, the court settles for implementing the will of another. It
may do so by reconstructing the original legislative "deal" 65-predicting
what the enacting legislators would have done with the issue before them,
considering legislative history as appropriate. 166  Failing that, some judges
adopt rules designed to alter legislative drafting. Just as courts interpreting
contacts adopt a parol evidence rule, courts reading statutes might adhere to
plain meaning. Such an approach encourages the legislature to state the
deal as precisely as possible. A court is not, however, constrained to deter-
mining the will of the parties. Judges also police the bargaining process.
Just as courts interpreting contracts consider duress and unequal bargaining
power, courts reading the product of the political community adjust for sys-
temic underrepresentation.
This challenge affects the relative weight accorded each theory of in-
terpretation. As a bargain, the statute lacks an overriding purpose or best
governing hedges predicated on assumption that business property is not a capital asset). By overturning
this understanding, Arkansas Best created considerable confusion. See Edward Kleinbard & Suzanne F.
Greenberg, Business Hedges After Arkansas Best, 43 TAX L. REV. 393, 393 (1988) ("[T]he Arkansas
Best court has created substantial confusion as to the types of transactions that continue to qualify as
hedges for tax purposes, and, accordingly, has left open the potential for serious tax whipsaws for both
taxpayers and the Internal Revenue Service.").
163 See Posner, supra note 131, at 273 (claiming that it is "beyond the judicial competence to under-
take" an inquiry into "how completely the [interest] group prevailed upon Congress to do its will").
164 See Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 15 (describing an interpretive approach that "treats the statute
as a contract. [The judge] first identifies the contracting parties and then seeks to discover what they
resolved and what they left unresolved .... A judge then implements the bargain as a faithful agent but
without enthusiasm; asked to extend the scope of a back-room deal, he refuses unless the proof of the
deal's scope is compelling."). Some scholars challenge the contract analogy. See, e.g., Mark L. Movse-
sian, Are Statutes Really "Legislative Bargains"? The Failure of the Contract Analogy in Statutory In-
terpretation, 76 N.C. L. REv. 1145 (1998). Whatever the ultimate merits of the analogy, the claim in
this Article is relative, not absolute-that the contract analogy is most persuasive for items from the po-
litical community.
165 See Posner, supra note 16, at 817. Judge Posner later acknowledged that such reconstruction is
quite difficult. See Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 851
(1988).
166 There is disagreement over the extent to which the contract analogy permits the use of legislative
history. Compare Stephen F. Ross & Daniel Tranen, The Modern Parol Evidence Rule and Its Inplica-
tions for New Textualist Statutory Interpretation, 87 GEo. L.J. 195 (1998), with Movsesian, supra note
164.
167 In this sense, courts "discipline" the legislature. See Schacter, supra note 3, at 636.46.
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answer. Courts are left with actual intent, or statutory text, if evidence of
such intent is lacking. Extrinsic policy affects interpretation only at the
margins.
Judge Norris's opinions in Montana Wilderness Ass'n, Nine Quarter
Circle Ranch v. United States Forest Service168 illustrate the judicial stance
toward issues from the political community. That case considered whether
a provision in the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act 69 grant-
ing private land owners a right of access through the "national forest sys-
tem" applied outside Alaska. In determining the scope of the right of access
through the "national forest system," Judge Norris made no guess about the
best answer. Instead, he reconstructed the original deal by examining legisla-
tive history. His first opinion limited the right to lands in Alaska. 170 His sec-
ond opinion, issued after the submission of additional legislative history,
withdrew the first and held that the right extended to forests throughout the
United States. Judge Norris also may have subtly disciplined politics by
reading the statute narrowly in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary.
Within the context of federal lands law, the effect of the statute was "quite
malign" because, by granting private landowners a right of access denied to
the federal government it eliminated incentives to bargain and required the
government to incur high transaction costs.1
7 1
3. The Public Community and Constitutional Interpretation. Courts
can theoretically discern the views of the public community, but have diffi-
culty doing so. The concepts that move this community are accessible to
judges as members of society at large, but seldom answer specific questions
of statutory interpretation.172 The product of a community lacking a spe-
cialized perspective, these concepts consist largely of symbols 73 and stories
that fit uneasily into legal discourse. 174 These concepts lack the sharp
168 655 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1981).
169 Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371 (1980).
170 See No. 80-3374 (filed May 14, 198 1), published in ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 7, at 797-
802.
171 See ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 7, at 811-12.
172 See Mark H. Moore, What Sort of Ideas Become Public Ideas?, in THE POWER OF PUBLIC IDEAS
55, 79 (Robert B. Reich ed., 1990) ("[lit is not clear reasoning or carefully developed and interpreted
facts that make ideas convincing. Rather, ideas seem to become anchored in peoples's minds through
illustrative anecdotes, simple diagrams and pictures, or connections with broad common-sense ideolo-
gies that define human nature and social responsibilities.").
173 See Llewellyn, supra note 76, at 24 (describing the public perspective as "the combination of in-
tense loyalty to a symbol with total emptiness of concrete content").
174 See Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Betwcen Legal Power and Marra-
tive Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225, 2259-60 (1989) (arguing that narrative lacks the generality, non-
reflexibility, and reliability necessary for an institutionalized discourse).
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boundaries favored in policy analysis.17 Thus, they are too fuzzy and ab-
stract to generate legislative detail.
This intermediate access makes statutory interpretation similar to con-
stitutional construction. Although there are many ways to construe the con-
stitution, constitutional interpretation is especially sensitive to public
values. 76 As Chief Justice Marshall recognized, "it is a constitution we are
expounding."'17  This public quality encourages courts to abandon tradi-
tional legal materials, like statutory language and legislative history, and
grasp popular understandings directly.' Such abandonment, however, is
not inevitable, and courts confronting public issues often adhere to their
professional role.1
7 9
This challenge offered by the public community affects the weight at-
tached to each theory of interpretation. On the one hand, the case for text
diminishes. 180  The public knows and cares little about statutory lan-
guage.' 18 On the other hand, the diversity of the public community makes
determination of a best answer hazardous. In cases in which public under-
standing is clear, however, the center of gravity shifts toward best answer.
175 See Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive
Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1105, 1150-51 (1989) (describing the radial and container metaphors
underlying speech).
176 See generally JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, THE INTELLIGIBLE CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME COURT'S
OBLIGATION TO MAINTAIN THE CONSTITUTION AS SOMETHING WE THE PEOPLE CAN UNDERSTAND (1992).
177 M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
178 See Philip B. Kurland, Curia Regis: Some Comments on the Divine Right of Kings and Courts
"To Say What the Law Is, " 23 ARIz. L. REv. 581, 591 (1981) (observing that whenever a judge quotes
Marshall's language in M'Culloch, "you can be sure that the Court will be throwing the constitutional
text, its history, and its structure to the winds in reaching its conclusion").
"' Cf RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134-36 (1978) (arguing that some constitu-
tional clauses appeal to moral concepts while others lay down particular conceptions).
1s0 See MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN
STATE 219 (1998) ("Judges prefer to rely on legal texts; they will generally abandon those texts, and
make decisions designed to achieve beneficial results, only when they have some assurance that the be-
liefs that motivate them are strongly felt and widely held, that is, that these beliefs are truly elements of
social morality."); Pope, supra note 96, at 360 (urging a broad reading of"republican statutes" resulting
from populist movements).
Conversely, as Professor Schauer notes, textualism dominates cases lacking broad public interest.
He claimed reliance on plain meaning in most Supreme Court cases in a recent term "should come as
little surprise. For there was one factor that (to me) was present in every one of these cases: None of
them was interesting. Not one. Compared to flag burning or affirmative action or separation of powers
or political patronage, these cases struck me as real dogs." Schauer, supra note 3, at 247.
181 Cf Llewellyn, supra note 76, at 24:
Whereas the public not only know nothing ofthe real operation of the Constitution-they also care
nothing about it. What difference whether income taxation rests on 'interpretation' or Amend-
ment? What matter-to most-whether the 18th Amendment be on the books, and if on the
books, whether it or a Volstead Act do the forbidding; whether New York has thirty-nine represen-
tatives, or fifty-two, or eighty-seven; whether Congress or the States regulate longshoremen's ac-
cident compensation; whether impeachment ofjudges calls for majority, two-thirds, three-fourths,
or unanimous vote; whether 'to receive ambassadors' does or does not imply the power of refusing
recognition to a foreign government?
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Bob Jones University v. United States'82 illustrates a best answer ap-
proach based on public understanding. 183 That case considered whether a
private religious school that discriminated on the basis of race qualified for
tax exemption as a corporation organized for "religious, charitable,... or
educational purposes." °8 In holding that it did not, Chief Justice Burger's
majority opinion went far beyond statutory language' 85 and relied on mate-
rials not formally relevant. It found such discrimination to be contrary to
the national public policy against racial discrimination, declared in Brown v
Board ofEducation, executive order,187 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Indeed, Chief Justice Burger's opinion ultimately drew on fundamental
American values beyond any of these sources.
188
D. Identifying the Responsible Community
A critical task, obviously, is determining which communities are re-
sponsible for which issues. Performing this task ultimately entails a judg-
ment about the division of labor in government. The overall pattern is
clear: the policy community handles most issues confronting courts, 189 the
political community deals with many such issues, and the public commu-
nity touches only a few.'90
Subject matter offers one clue to community responsibility. Responsibil-
ity varies depending upon whether the issue is technical, distributional, or
ideological. The policy community dominates technical issues, those ancil-
lary to larger decisions. Resolving those issues requires the specialized sub-
182 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
183 See Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, Race. Religion & Public Policy. Bob Jones University
v. United States, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 2 (suggesting that "the Court was busy speaking to the press,
and to posterity").
194 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000) (exempting organizations "organized and operated exclusively for
religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes").
185 See Freed & Polsby, supra note 183, at 5 (noting that the Court did not carefully parse statutory
language but instead "wrote an opinion that ... one encountered only on the opinion pages of nvspa-
pers, a case with an obvious outcome, dictated by clear and long-standing policy"). The amicus argued
that discrimination was inconsistent with the word "charitable" in the statute. Sce Bob Jones. 461 U.S.
at 586 ("[E]ntitlement to tax exemption depends on meeting certain common.law standards of charity").
That argument was by no means compelling. One could maintain that a charitable purpose vas but one
ground for tax exemption and that Bob Jones University could qualify by serving an educational or reli-
gious purpose.
186 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
187 Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 592-96.
188 See Robert M. Cover, Foreward, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L REv. 4. 28 (1983) (arguing
that the decision in Bob Jones was based on more than mere public policy).
189 See Stephen F. Ross, The Limited Relevance of Plain Meaning, 73 WASHI. U. LQ. 1057 (1995) (ar-
guing that most noncriminal federal statutes "are not directed at ordinary citizen spzakers of English, but at
a small community of lawyers, regulators, and people subject to their specific regulations").
190 See THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREM iE COURT 143-45 (1989) (de-
scribing evidence indicating that the public is ignorant of all but a few Supreme Court rulings).
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stantive knowledge that defines this community. The political community
gravitates towards distributional issues' 9l-those conferring concentrated
economic benefits'92 on groups organized around narrow interests.193 Such
groups' abilities to closely monitor legislation gives them political power.1
94
The public community follows ideological issues, highly emotional ques-
tions with broad impact. Rising above the interest group politics issues
like civil rights, school prayer, and abortion engage society at large.195
Moreover, there are two markers of community involvement. One is the
type of secondary source discussing the issue. The policy community writes
the detailed analyses contained in committee reports, regulations, and judicial
opinions. The political community assumes more prominence in floor state-
ments, public speeches, and the trade press. Public attention usually emerges
in the popular media. 196 A second marker is the briefing of the case. The
filing of amicus briefs indicates that the issue has gained prominence.
97
The filing of such briefs by industry groups indicates political interest;
whereas, the filing of briefs by ideological groups indicates public interest.
Community involvement can certainly be difficult to ascertain. In
many leading statutory interpretation cases, however, relative community
involvement is pretty clear. Locke presents a case from the policy commu-
191 See Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 17 (identifying private interest statutes by looking "for the in-
dicia of rent-seeking legislation: limitations on new entry into the business, subsidies of one group by
another, prohibitions of private contracting in response to the new statutory entitlements"); see also Esk-
ridge, supra note 46, at 323-25 (describing how judicial response to statutes might vary depending upon
whether costs and benefit are concentrated or distributed).
192 Political scientists have long considered the effect of the concentration of costs and benefits
upon legislation. See JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS 153 (1973); see also RANDALL B.
RIPLEY & GRACE A. FRANKLIN, CONGRESS, THE BUREAUCRACY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 21-23, 25-26
(1987); DAVID J. VOLGER, THE POLITICS OF CONGRESS (1974) (describing patterns); Theodore J. Lowi,
American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory, 16 WORLD POL. 677, 692-95,
703-15 (1964).
193 See Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 17 (identifying private interest laws by looking to the legisla-
tive process: who lobbied for the legislation and what deals were struck).
194 See DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 92 (1974) (politicians must
produce results to appease organized interest groups). Other interests are more easily satisfied with
mere statements. See id. at 132 ("[l]n a large class of legislative undertakings the electoral payment is
for positions rather than for effects.").
195 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
196 See RICHARD DAVIS, DECISIONS AND IMAGES: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESS 73 (1994)
(reporting that journalists find newsworthy those "[c]ases with potentially far-reaching implications in
the larger social and political environment"); cf. Pope, supra note 96, at 361 (identifying republican stat-
utes by widespread and serious public discussion, direct citizen action, such as social protest, and exten-
sive activity by voluntary associations and social movements).
197 The filing of amicus briefs is an important factor in the granting of certiorari. See Gregory A.
Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda-Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM.
POL. Scd. REv. 1109, 1122 (1988) (concluding that the filing of an amicus brief can increase the likeli-
hood of review by 40-50%). "Through participation as amici, organized interests effectively communi-
cate to the justices information about the array of forces at play in the litigation, who is at risk, and the
number and variety of parties regarding the litigation as significant." Id. at 1123.
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nity. The issue of whether statutory language requiring a filing "before De-
cember 31" permitted a filing made on that date was ancillary to the overall
scheme and, like most procedural issues, fell within the lawyer's expertise.
Politicians do not care about such matters, unless a particular date is essen-
tial to conferring a promised benefit. 198  External markers confirm this
placement. The only secondary sources discussing the filing date were the
committee report and the implementing regulation. Only one of the five
amicus briefs filed before the Supreme Court discussed the meaning of
"December 31 ,199 Industry attention focused on whether conclusively pre-
suming abandonment from a failure to file was constitutional.
Montana Wilderness provides a good example of an issue from the po-
litical community. This issue directly involved the scope of a concentrated
economic benefit granted to an organized group, the owners of private lands
in national parks. External markers confirm this placement. Members of
Congress wrote letters to the administration and to each other on the issue.
20
The issue did not, however, receive widespread coverage in the popular press.
Bob Jones exemplifies an issue from the public community. The spe-
cial status of race and education in America makes the issue of discrimina-
tion in college highly ideological.20 1 External markers corroborate public
interest. After the Court granted certiorari, but before oral argument, the
Reagan administration reversed its position in the case, leading to wide-
spread criticism in the popular press. 20 2  The Court received twenty-five
amicus briefs from churches, civil rights groups, and individuals.
203
198 In this respect, Locke differs from Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund .
Lady Baltimore Foods, Inc., 960 F.2d 1339 (7th Cir. 1992). In that case, Judge Posner disregarded a
"slip of the pen" that required action "before January 12" when it was clear that members of Congress
intended to convey a subsidy in the case before the court. Id. at 1346 (the "amendment was intended by
every member of Congress who voted for it to exempt" the defendant). By contrast, the date enacted in
Locke still permitted the benefit.
199 Brief of Amicus Curiae State of Nevada, United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985) (No. 83-
1394).
200 Members of Congress spoke directly to the issue of whether the Act applied outside of Alaska.
See ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 7, at 801, 804 (quoting statements of Representatives Udall,
Sieberling, and Weaver, and a "Dear Colleague" letter from Senator Melcher).
201 See Bob Jones, 461 U.S. 574, 595 (1983) ('Few social or political issues in our history have
been more vigorously debated and more extensively ventilated than the issue of racial discrimination,
particularly in education."). Furthermore, the issue was not purely policy or political. Determining the
meaning of "charitable" required little knowledge of technical tax law, see Livingston, supra note 102
at 830 nA9 ("Bob Jones University was in many respects an atypical tax case, as it involved significant
nontax policy questions and was largely devoid of tax 'context."'), and the issue did not involve confer-
ring a benefit on a concentrated group, so much as allocating the claims of two competing groups, ra-
cially discriminatory schools, and racial minorities.
202 See Freed & Polsby, supra note 183, at 1-2 (describing the "public controversy" surrounding the
case). For editorials, see N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1982, at A14; Jan. 19, 1982, at A26; Feb. 5, 1982, at
A38; and WASH. POST, Jan 12, 1982, at AI6.
203 See Briefs of Amicus Curiae The American Baptist Churches in the U.S.A., The American Civil
Liberties Union, The American Jewish Committee, The Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, The
659
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III. INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES AND JUDICIAL AGREEMENT
The debate over the appropriate theory of interpretation blends descrip-
tive and normative perspectives. To appreciate more fully the significance
of interpretive communities, it is useful to consider two additional ques-
tions. One is "Why do judges agree on statutory interpretation?" Notwith-
standing the debate over theory, courts display widespread consensus on
statutory issues.2 4 Interpretive communities help explain why judges find
so many cases easy to decide.205 Those communities affect a court's choice
of theory, its preferences among sources of legislative history, and its deci-
sion to defer to administrative interpretation.
A. The Choice of a Theory of Interpretation
Judges show surprising agreement over the theory of interpretation ap-
plicable to a given case 20 6 and, in reaching such agreement, every judge at
least occasionally departs from his favored theories. Justices Brennan,
Blackmun, and Stevens sometimes adopt textualism, 20 7 whereas Justice
Scalia and Judge Easterbrook sometimes adopt intentionalism. °s
Center for Law and Religious Freedom of the Christian Legal Society, The Church of God in Christ,
Mennonite, The Church of God, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, William T. Coleman,
Congressman Trent Lott, General Conference Mennonite Church, The Independent Sector, The Interna-
tional Human Rights Law Group, Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence Lewy, The Lawyers' Committee for
Civil Rights Under Law, The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, The NAACP
Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., The National Association of Evangelicals, The National As-
sociation of Independent Schools, The National Committee for Amish Religious Freedom, The North
Carolina Association of Black Lawyers, The National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs,
The United Church of Christ, Bernard Wolfman, Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 595
(1983) (No. 81-1 and 81-3).
204 In the federal system, where most law is statutory, roughly 90% of published courts of appeals
opinions are unanimous. See Harry T. Edwards, The Judicial Function and the Elusive Goal of Princl.
pled Decisionmaking, 1991 WiS. L. REV. 837, 856 (noting that in 1983-84, dissents were filed in 5.8%
of the total cases decided by the D.C. Circuit (13% of cases decided by full opinion); in 1989-90, dis-
sents were filed in 2.6% of the total cases (10% of cases decided by full opinion)).
205 Judge Edwards of the D.C. Circuit, for example, finds only 5-15% of his cases "very hard," by
which he means involving "some significant measure of discretion." See Harry T. Edwards, The Role of
a Judge in Modern Society: Some Reflections on Current Practice in Federal Appellate Adjudication, 32
CLEV. ST. L. REv. 385, 390 (1983-84).
206 See Daniel A. Farber, Do Theories of Statutory Interpretation Matter? A Case Study, 94 Nw. U.
L. REv. 1409, 1432 (2000) (noting that Judges Posner and Easterbrook disagree with each other in only
1.1% of the cases).
207 For Justice Brennan, see, e.g., Mallard v. United States Dist. Ct. for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 490
U.S. 296 (1989); Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988); Honig v. Doe, 484
U.S. 305, 308 (1988); Int'l Paper v. Ouelette, 479 U.S. 481, 500 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
208 For Justice Scalia, see. e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 669-74 (1990) (ap-
pealing to purpose of statute); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 100 (1989) (seeking to "develop an
interpretation of the statute that is reasonable, consistent and faithful to its apparent purpose"); United
States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 444 (1988) (interpreting the Civil Service Reform Act by reference to its
"purpose"); see also United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 82 (1994) ("I have been will.
ing, in the case of civil statutes, to acknowledge a doctrine of 'scrivener's error' that permits a court to
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The leading explanation for such agreement is Professors Eskridge and
Frickey's "practical reasoning" model, 2" which explains judicial agreement
over theories of interpretation in terms of a "funnel of abstraction." This
funnel begins with statutory text, extends through legislative intent and leg-
islative purpose, and ends with the evolution of the statute and current pol-
icy.2t0  Practical reasoning gives priority to more concrete theories.2' A
clear text creates a presumption that is overcome only if abstract factors to
the contrary are "compelling."
212
Professor Eskridge uses practical reasoning to explain how judges select
a theory of interpretation in a given case. Board of Governors v. Dimension
Financial Corp. provides a situation in which statutory language proved
compelling. In that case, the Supreme Court unanimously struck down regu-
lations extending the jurisdiction of the Federal Reserve Board ("Board") to
"nonbank banks." Such institutions perform banking functions, but fall out-
side the Bank Holding Act definition of a bank as an institution that "(1) ac-
cepts deposits that the depositor has a legal right to withdraw on demand, and
(2) engages in the business of making commercial loans.' 2 14 Attempting to
regulate a growing segment of financial institutions, the Board extended this
definition to institutions that allowed demand withdrawal and engaged in
money market transactions. Contrary to their dynamic approach in Weber,
give an unusual (though not unheard-of) meaning to a word which, ifgiven its normal meaning, would
produce an absurd and arguably unconstitutional result."); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Adrain-
istrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DuKE LJ. 511, 515 (acknowledging that policy evaluation is "part
of the traditional judicial tool-kit").
209 This model is similar to Ronald Dworkin's view that statutory interpretation is like a chain novel
in which legislature and judge write different chapters. Ronald Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEX
L. REv. 541 (1982) ("Suppose that a group of novelists is engaged for a particular project and that they
draw lots to determine the order of play. The lowest number writes the opening chapter of a novel, which
he or she then sends to the next number, with the understanding that he is adding a chapter to that novel
rather than beginning a new one, and then sends the two chapters to the next number and so on."); see also
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 313 (1986) (explaining that a judge interpreting statutes "will treat
Congress as an author earlier than himself in the chain of law, though an author with special powers and
responsibilities different from his own [as ajudge], and he will see his own role as fundamentally the crea-
tive one of a partner continuing to develop, in what he believes is the best way, the statutory scheme Con-
gress began. He will ask himself which reading of the act... shows the political history including and
surrounding that statute in the better light. His view of how the statute should be read will in part depend on
what certain congressmen said when debating it. But it will also depend on the best answer to political
questions: how far Congress should defer to public opinion in matters of this sort, for example.").
210 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 5, at 352 (describing funnel of abstraction); see also
ESKRIDGE, supra note 3, at 56 (describing a slightly different version of funnel).
211 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 5, at 353 ('For example .... the interpreter will value more
highly a good argument based on the statutory text than a conflicting and equally strong argument based
upon the statutory purpose.").
212 See id. at 352 ("pV]hile an apparently clear text... will create insuperable doubts for a contrary
interpretation if the other evidence reinforces it... an apparently clear text may yield if other consid-
erations cut against it.").
213 474 U.S. 361 (1986).
214 12 U.S.C. § 184 1(c) (1970).
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Justices Brennan, Marshall, and White joined Chief Justice Burger's opinion
striking down the regulation as contrary to the statutory language. Professor
Eskridge defends this result, finding that Dimension Financial presented clear
statutory language not rebutted by more abstract factors.215
Conversely, Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co. 216 provides a situation
in which text proved far less compelling. That case considered the meaning
of a Federal Rule of Evidence excluding proof of a prior conviction if the
probative effect of such evidence was outweighed, on balance, by the preju-
dicial effect to the "defendant." 217 The Court unanimously rejected a purely
textual reading that would have allowed civil defendants, but not civil plain-
tiffs, to exclude such proof.218 Agreeing that the rule could not constitution-
ally differentiate between plaintiffs and defendants in civil cases and that
the rule had a drafting error,2 19 all the Justices, Scalia included self-
consciously rewrote the statute220 and consulted legislative history.22 1 Pro-
fessor Eskridge explains Bock Laundry as a situation in which compelling
abstract factors trumped statutory language. 222 Interestingly, the Court split
over how to rewrite the statute. Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens held
that Congress actually intended to limit balancing to criminal cases. 223 Dis-
215 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 3, at 1542 ("When the statutory text is reasonably determinate and re-
fleets historically recent legislative deliberation, my cautious model of dynamic interpretation would not
counsel further evolution of the statute to reflect changed circumstances of which the legislature was
generally aware.").
216 490 U.S. 504 (1989).
217 At the time, Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a) provided:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the witness has been
convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from the witness or established by public record
during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in ex-
cess of one year under the law under which the witness was convicted, and the court determines
that the probative effect of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant,
or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
The case also involved Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Bock Laundry, 490 U.S. at 524-26.
218 Such a rule would likely have been unconstitutional, in which case, no party, even a criminal de-
fendant, would have been entitled to exclude a felony conviction.
219 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 3, at 68 ("Interestingly not contested [in Bock Laundry] were the
propositions that, as written, Rule 609 ... was unconstitutional, that this was the result of a drafting er-
ror, and that the Court should rewrite the rule.").
220 Scalia did claim that his rewrite did "the least violence to the text." Bock Laundry, 490 U.S. at 529.
221 See id. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I think it entirely appropriate to consult all public materi-
als, including the background of Rule 609(a)(1) and the legislative history of its adoption, to verify what
seems to us an unthinkable disposition (civil defendants but not civil plaintiffs receive the benefit of
weighing prejudice) was indeed unthought of, and thus to justify a departure from the ordinary meaning
of the word 'defendant' in the Rule.").
222 See Eskridge, supra note 15, at 437 (describing Bock Laundry as an example of practical reason-
ing, i.e., accepting most of the text's policy judgments and unprincipled distinctions while rejecting oth-
ers); see also 490 U.S. at 430-31 (finding text not helpful).
223 See Bock Laundry, 490 U.S. at 524 (concluding that Congress "intended that only the accused in
a criminal case should be protected from unfair prejudice by the balance test set out in Rule 609(a)(1)").
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senting, Justice Blackmun relied on the reasoning of the conference com-
mittee report and extended the balancing test to all parties in civil suits.
224
Somewhere between Dimension Financial and Bock Laundry are cases
in which text holds limited appeal. One such case is Griffin v. Oceanic
Contractors, Inc.,225 which considered whether a statute stating that a ship
owner "shall" pay a terminated seaman two days' wages for each day the
owner fails to pay back wages226 applied even after the seaman took another
job. The Supreme Court split on this issue. Pointing to statutory language,
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion held that the penalty applied.227 Rely-
ing on the "spirit" of the statute, Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion
claimed that the statute authorized tolling of damages.2  Scholars also split
on the correct result in Griffin. Professors Eskridge and Frickey themselves
initially disagreed over the correct result in that case,229 and Professor Esk-
ridge changed his opinion seven years later. ° The practical reasoning
model indicates that these split opinions result from the difficulty of deter-
mining whether abstract considerations were sufficiently compelling to
overcome an apparently clear text.23
Practical reasoning alone, however, does not explain the agreement
over theory in these cases. That model contains no means for assessing
clarity or attaching weight to abstract factors. Thus, it does not explain the
opposite conclusions reached in Dimension Financial and Bock Laundry.
Practical reasoning does not indicate that the Bank Holding Act is clearer
than the Federal Rules of Evidence. Both can be read literally. Nor does it
indicate why upholding the integrity of federal banking regulation is less
224 See id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("(T]he reasoning of the Report suggests that by 'prejudice to
the defendant,' Congress meant 'prejudice to a party.'").
225 458 U.S. 564 (1982).
226 The statute provided that "[e]very master or owner who refuses or neglects to make payments in
the manner hereinbefore mentioned without sufficient cause shall pay to the seaman a sum equal to the
two days' pay for each and every day during which payment is delayed beyond the respective periods."
46 U.S.C. § 596 (1983).
227 See Griffin, 458 U.S. at 574 ('Congress intended the statute to mean exactly what its plain lan-
guage says.").
228 See id. at 577 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Holy Trinity Church v. United States. 143
U.S. 457 (1892)).
229 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 5, at 339 n.69 (In the end, one ofus is comfortable with the
outcome in Griffin. The other is uncomfortable, but leaning in that direction as well.").
230 Compare Eskridge & Frickey. supra note 5, at 339 n.69 ('I]f one concludes that the award in
Gr.ffn Vill deter maritime system-wide abuse of a relatively defenseless class of employees, that result
seems quite plausible."), with ESKRIDGE, supra note 3, at 201 ("1 am now inclined to agree with Justice
John Paul Stevens.").
231 Professors Eskridge and Frickey recognize this difficulty in Griffin. Sec Eskridge & Frickey,
supra note 5, at 349 (explaining that the Court's result was supported by the "relatively clear statutory
language, the original legislative intent, the overall statutory purpose, and (to some extent) the reason-
ableness of the interpretation.").
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compelling than avoiding a holding of unconstitutionality. 232  Likewise,
practical reasoning does not explain why Griffin proved so difficult. It does
not explain why judges disagreed over the relative weight to be attached to
a literal reading of "shall" compared to the policy avoiding harsh results.
The interpretive community account helps explain pragmatic intui-
tions. Interpretive communities form part of the cultural context shaping
judicial opinions.233 The communities' views filter through to judges in two
ways. First, interpretive communities author the statute. Their perspective
seeps through materials produced during enactment. Second, interpretive
communities comprise the audience for the judicial opinion. Judges con-
sider potential legislative responses to their decisions, 234 and those re-
sponses differ depending upon the community affected. Thus, judges
distinguish the momentous235 from the trivial.236 They know which opin-
ions engage the policy,237 political,238 and public communities.239
232 For a similar argument, see Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interprelation,
78 GEO. L.J. 353, 408 (1989) ("Eskridge's analysis of [Weber and Dimension] as involving polar oppo-
sites in a dynamic model is open to question. The statute at issue in Dimension looks at least as inde-
terminate as that in Weber. Why argue against dynamic interpretation in Dimension but for judicial
updating in Weber?").
233 See KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 60 (1960);
RICHARD A. POSNER, PROBLEMS IN JURISPRUDENCE 100 (1990) ("Thinking like a lawyer" is "neither
method nor doctrine, but a repertoire of acceptable argument and a feel for the degree and character of
doctrinal stability, or more generally, for the contours of a professional culture.").
234 See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 149 (1998) (citing an empiri-
cal study finding that in nearly 60% of cases, a justice makes some comment about the preference and
likely actions of other government actors); DAVIS, supra note 196, at 172 (reporting that over 60% of Su-
preme Court press corps believe that Congress or White House reaction is at a least a "somewhat important
factor" in the justices' decision-making process). Even textualist judges consider the reactions of other
branches. See United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 346 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (arguing
that statutes should be interpreted "in a fashion which fosters that democratic process"); Schacter, supra
note 3, at 645 (arguing that Justice Scalia and Judge Easterbrook's textualism attempts to foster democracy
by encouraging better drafting and narrowing statutory law).
235 For example, when the Court accepted a case to reconsider Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), it
was swamped with letters and public protests. See EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS 373-74
(1998).
236 Justices regard some cases as trivial. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, DECISION: HOW THE SUPREME
COURT DECIDES CASES 113 (1996) (stating that Justice Stewart called them "dogs" or "nothing cases");
BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 148 (1979) (noting that Justice Harlan called
such cases "peewees"); id. at 425 (claiming that Justice Brennan had a scatological name for them); id.
at 490 (relating that Justice Rehnquist had "nothing but contempt" for them).
237 See DAVIS, supra note 196, at 172 (reporting that over half of the Supreme Court press corps be-
lieves that the legal community's potential reaction is at least "a somewhat important factor" in the Justices'
decisionmaking process).
238 See id. at 147 (describing the effect ofamicus briefs on grants ofcertiorari).
239 See id. (reporting that nearly half of the Supreme Court press corps believe that public opinion polls
and press coverage of court are "somewhat important factors" in the Justices' decisionmaking process).
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The focus on prominent cases like Weber2 40 has largely obscured the
influence of interpretative communities on statutory interpretation. Present-
ing a wide aray of options, public issues such as civil rights often spark
disagreement.24 - They inspire some to engage in dynamic interpretation
242
and encourage even traditionalists, including Justices Brennan and
Rehnquist, to invoke concepts far removed from the statutory issue of the
meaning of "discrimination., 243 such as the "plight of the Negro in our
economy1244 aind "equality." 45
240 See Frickey, supra note 9, at 245 ("Weber was a very visible and important decision. In 1979, the
affirmative action issue was not just on the minds of many judges, attorneys, legislators, acadflemies, and
other opinion leaders, it was a matter of'general conversation."). The Court received over 25 amicus briefs
from employers, employees, and civil rights groups. See Briefs of Amicus Curiae The Affirmative Action
Coordinating Center, The American Civil Liberties Union; The American Federation of State, County and
Municipal Employees; The American G.I. Forum; The Asian American Legal Defense and Educational
Fund; The California Correctional Officers Association; The California Fair Employment Practice Com-
mission; The Chicago Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law; The City of Los Angeles;, The
Committee on Academic Nondiscrimination and Integrity, The Congressional Black Caucus; The Equal
Employment Advisory Council; The Government Contract Employees Association; The Lawyers'
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law;, The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People;
The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.; The National Coordinating Committee for Trade
Union Action and Democracy; The National Medical Association; The National Puerto Rican Coalition;
The National Union of Hospital and Health Care Employees; The Pacific Legal Foundation; The Honorable
Patricia Schroeder, The United Electrical, Radio and Machine Vorkers of America; The Washington Legal
Foundation; The Southeastern Legal Foundation; The Women's Equal Rights Legal Defense Fund; United
Steelworkers ofAm. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (Nos. 78-432,78-435,78436).
241 See Thomas R. Hensley & Scott P. Johnson, Unanimity on the Rehnquist Court, 31 AERtON L
REV. 387,404 (1998) ("While 51% of non-civil liberties cases were unanimous, only 27% of civil liber-
ties cases unified the Justices."); see also C. HERMAN PRITCHETr, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN
JUDICIAL POLITICS AND VALUE, 1937-1947, at 25-31 (1948) (demonstrating that attitudes are a critical
determinant of civil liberties cases), supra notes 104, 195 and accompanying text.
242 See ESKRttx, supra note 3, at 1516; Zeppos, supra note 232, at 408 ("Perhaps the reason that Esk-
ridge [argues for dynamic interpretation in Weber but not in Dimension Financial is that Eskridge] (like
myself) cares more about affirmative action than he does about interstate banking."). This public quality
may have persuaded Justice Marshall to join the majority, notwithstanding his textualist opinions in Locke
and Arkansas BesL See supra text accompanying note 232; see also Frederick Sehauer, Prediction and
Particularity, 78 B.U. L. REV. 773, 785 n.32 (1998) C'T]he Justices ofthe Supreme Court, like many ofthe
rest of us, likely have stronger policy preferences about abortion, affirmative action, prayer in the schools,
pornography, gay rights, and the rights of those accused of crimes than about many questions of common
law or statutory interpretation... That being the case, the empirical analysis might conclude that legal
variables ... would have more explanatory and predictive power for non-Supreme Court constitutional
cases than they do for that quite limited set").
243 See WiLLm N. ESKIDGE, JR. & PHIUP P. FRICKEY, TEACHERS' MANUAL FOR CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STA11JTES AND THE CREATION OF PuBuc POLICY 21 (1995) (criticizing both
Brennan and Rehnquist for "taking one broad purpose and running with it"); id. (stating that most of the
legislative history cited by Brennan is equally susceptible to a color blind reading); i. at 22 (noting that "at
least most of" the legislative history quoted by Rehnquist has "little to do with the issue in Veber-).
244 Weber, 443 U.S. at 202 (quoting remarks of Senator Humphrey).
245 See id at 254 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("For if the spirit of the Act eludes the cold words ofthe
statute itself, it rings out with unmistakable clarity in the words ofthe elected representatives who made the
Act law. It is equality.").
95:629 (2001)
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Most low profile cases present a narrower range of options. Judges
usually agree on routine issues, 246 and the interpretative community account
helps explain why. Agreement is more likely for issues involving a single
community. The textualist approach adopted in Dimension Financial re-
flected the importance of the issue to the political community. The statu-
tory exception to the Bank Holding Act conferred a concentrated benefit on
organized groups.247 External markers confirm political interest. Politi-
cians discussed the issue,248 as did the trade press. 249 Two industry groups
filed amicus briefs on the issue.2
By contrast, the decision to rewrite the statute in Bock Laundry reflects
the ease with which the issue of whether the statute "meant what it said" fell
within the domain of the policy community. Legal expertise confirmed the
irrationality of distinguishing between plaintiffs and defendants in civil
cases.25' That distinction was unrelated to the political compromise. The
House bill allowed impeachment only with crimes involving veracity,
252
whereas the Senate bill also permitted impeachment with felony convic-
tions. 3 The conference agreement compromised by allowing impeachment
with crimes involving veracity and felony convictions for which the probative
value of admission exceeded the prejudicial effect to the defendant. Likely
added by staff, the word "defendant" was wholly unrelated to this deal. By
contrast, the decision as to how to rewrite the statute-whether to require bal-
246 See Hensley & Johnson, supra note 241, at 399 ("While 44% of routine cases were unanimous, the
Court achieved unanimity in only 16% of important cases."). Routine issues were those not reported by the
New York Times or the United States Supreme Court Reports: Lawyers Edition. See THOMAS HENSLEY ET
AL., THE CHANGING CONSTITUTION: CONSTITUrIONAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 864 (1997); see also Ed-
ward N. Beiser, The Rhode Island Supreme Court: A Well Integrated Political System, 8 LAW & SOC'Y
REv. 167, 175 (1973). Quick decisions also tend to be unanimous. See Hensley & Johnson, supra note
241, at 397 ("[Wlhen the Justices spent less than three months between oral argument and the decision date,
the Court ruled unanimously in 55% of its decisions. Conversely, when the Justices devoted more than
three months to a case, the Court resulted in unanimity only 23% of the time.").
247 The demand deposit language was added to exempt savings banks and industrial banks. See S. REP.
No. 89-1179, at 12 (1966). The requirement that banks make commercial loans was added to remove a sin-
gle institution. See 116 CONG. REc. 25,848 (1970) (amendment by Senator Brooke to remove the Boston
Safe Deposit and Trust Co.).
248 See 116 CONG. REc. 25,848 (1970) (amendment by Senator Brooke).
249 See, e.g., Steve Blakely, Non-Bank Bank Controversy Blocks Key Industry Legislation, 44 CONG. Q.
WKLY. REP. 2143 (1986); Leon E. Wynter, Congress Is Squeezed on Nonbank' Issue, Growing Numbers of
Firms Seek Market Entry, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 1986, at A6.
250 See Briefs of Amicus Curiae Independent Bankers Association of America, Sears, Roebuck and
Co., Bd. ofGovemors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 36J (1986) (No. 84-1274).
251 Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 510 (1989) ("No matter how plain the text of the
Rule may be, we cannot accept an interpretation that would deny a civil plaintiff the same right to impeach
an adversary's testimony that it grants to a civil defendant.').
252 See H.R. REP. No. 93-650, at 11 (1973).
253 See id.; see also 120 CONG. REc. 37,076, 37,083 (1974). The conference agreement compromised
by admitting crimes involving veracity and felony convictions for which the probative value of admission
exceeded the prejudicial effect to the defendant.
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ancing in all cases or just in criminal cases--stands closer to the political
deal. Politicians clearly cared about how often felony convictions would be
admitted and might conceivably have limited balancing to criminal cases.
Secondary sources confirm that the Bock Laundry issue fell within the
policy community. The rules of evidence were initially drafted by an advi-
sory committee appointed at the recommendation of the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States,25 4 and after deciding Bock Laundry, the Supreme
Court itself modified the applicable rule.2S No politician or group spoke to
the disparity between plaintiffs and defendants in civil suits. The only
amicus brief was filed by state attorneys general. z 6
Conversely, theoretical disagreement is more likely for issues for
which community responsibility is murky. The split opinion in Griffin re-
flects the difficulty of determining the responsible community for the toll-
ing issue. Justice Rehnquist viewed the issue as part of a political deal. z 7
That community sometimes prescribes penalties exceeding any possible
harm, here an award of over S300,000 for a wrongful failure to pay $412.50
in wages.~ Justice Stevens viewed the issue as one for the policy commu-
nity. Bent on avoiding absurd results,259 that community is unlikely to al-
low damages so greatly exceeding compensation. 60
On their face, both characterizations are plausible. The tolling issue
was related, but not central, to a political deal. The back pay provision was
intended to benefit American seamen, an organized interest group261 At the
same time, the tolling of damages was traditionally a policy question.262
Long established judicial practice permitted such tolling, 63 politicians were
silent on the issue, and no amicus briefs were filed in the case.
254 See 490 U.S. at 504.
255 See FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1), (2) (adopted Dec. 1, 1990).
256 See Brief of Amici Curiae Commonwealth of Pennsylvania et al., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach.
Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989) (No. 87-1816).
257 See Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982) (describing the provision as
"'designed to prevent, by its coercive effect, arbitrary refusals to pay wages, and thus to induce prompt
payment when payment is possible') (quoting Collie v. Fergusson. 281 U.S. 52 (1930)).
258 See id. at 576 ("It is probably true that Congress did not precisely envision the grossness of the
difference in this case between the actual wages withheld and the amount of the award required by the
statute.').
259 See id. at 578 n.1 (Stevens, L, dissenting) (noting the importance of avoiding absurd results).
260 See id. at 590 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
261 The purpose of the legislation generally was "the amelioration ofthe condition of the American
seamen," and the wage provision was "designed to secure the promptest possible penalty." H.R. REP.
No. 55-1657, at 2-3 (1898); see also S. REP. No. 54-832, at 2 (1896).
262 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 3, at 201 (noting that courts "have routinely imported equitable toll-
ing exceptions" into statutes of limitations).
263 See Griffin, 458 U.S. at 580 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Pacific Mail S.S. Co. v. Schmidt,
241 U.S. 245 (1916)).
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B. The Use of Legislative History
Judges also display widespread agreement over the relative importance
of different sources of legislative history.264 At the top of the hierarchy are
committee reports, which receive the most citations265 and the greatest
weight.266 In the middle are statements by representatives, which receive
less weight,2 67 unless made by a drafter or sponsor.268  At the bottom are
media accounts-press releases, advertising, and newspaper articles-
which are seldom cited.269
The leading explanation for the hierarchy of legislative history is con-
structive notice. Committee reports receive the most weight because legis-
264 See George A. Costello, Average Voting Members and Other "Benign Fictions": The Relative Reli-
ability of Committee Reports, Floor Debates, and Other Sources of Legislative History, 1990 DUKE L.J. 39,
41-42 ("Over the years, courts looking to legislative history to explain statutory meaning developed a rough
hierarchy of interpretational weight that should be given to the different elements of legislative history.
Traditionally--and as a general matter--committee report explanations are considered more persuasive and
reliable than statements made during floor debates or during hearings on a bill. Within the category of floor
debates, statement of sponsors and explanations by floor managers usually are accorded the most weight,
and statements by other committee members are next in importance. Statements by Members not associ-
ated with sponsorship or committee consideration of a bill are accorded little weight and statements by
bill opponents generally are discounted or considered unreliable. Committee hearings are generally
treated the same way as floor debates: Statements by sponsors or drafters are most persuasive, views of
other witnesses seldom carry much weight, and fears of opponents usually are dismissed as unreli-
able."); Eskridge, supra note 26, at 636-40 (describing the recent judicial hierarchy of legislative history
materials (drawing from the 1980s): committee reports, sponsor statements, rejected proposals, floor and
hearing colloquy, views of nonlegislator drafters, legislative inaction, and subsequent legislative history);
see also ESKRIDGE, supra note 3, at 222.
265 See Carro & Brann, supra note 66, at 291 (noting that from 1938-1979, 45% of Supreme Court
legislative history citations were to House or Senate committee reports); Koby, supra note 66, at 390
(finding the same pattern).
266 See 2A SUTHERLAND STAT. CONST. § 48.06 (Norman J. Singer ed., 5th ed. 2000) ("Committee re-
ports represent the most persuasive indicia of congressional intent in enacting a statute."); Reed Dickerson,
Statutory Interpretation: Dipping Into Legislative History, II HOFSTRA L. REV. 1125, 1131-32 (1983)
(explaining that after commission recommendations, "[c]ommittee reports are the second most reliable
kind of legislative history"); Wald, supra note 4, at 201 ("Committee reports indeed remain the most widely
accepted indicators of Congress's intent.").
267 A longstanding rule bars consideration of member statements. See 2A SUTHERLAND STAT. CONST.
§ 48.13 ("Statements by individual members of the legislature about the meaning of provisions in a bill...
are generally held not to be admissible as aids in construing the statute.'). This rule has eroded as courts
increasingly consider floor statements, see id. (describing increased willingness to consider statements
made in legislative debates), and hearing testimony, see Wald, supra note 4, at 202 ("The worth of hear-
ings--selectively used--seems to be increasing.... In many cases the best explanation of what the legisla-
tion is about comes from the executive department or outside witnesses at the hearings.'); see also
Eskridge, supra note 26, at 636-40.
268 See Note, A Re-Evaluation of the Use of Legislative History in the Federal Courts, 52 COLUM.
L. REV. 125, 129-30 (1952) (explaining that courts generally refuse to admit statements by individuals,
but give weight to statements by drafters and legislative sponsors).
269 See Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of "Popular Intent ": Interpretative Dilemmas in Direct Democ-
racy, 105 YALE L.J. 107, 122 (1995) (remarking that only 2% of courts interpreting statutes adopted by
popular initiative considered media reporting or advertising relevant).
The Missing Element in Statutory Interpretation
lators are most likely to notice and accept the views of persons closest to
the legislation. 270 According to this view, legislators are less likely to heed
member statements and are unlikely even to notice media descriptions.
Constructive notice, however, is a poor explanation of the hierarchy.
First, that theory does not explain legislator behavior. Legislators seldom
read committee reports. Written by staff, such reports may not be read by
even a single legislator.27'
Nor does constructive notice explain judicial behavior. First, that the-
ory does not explain why courts routinely favor drafter's statements over
materials more likely to have been noticed by the persons voting for the
bills. For example, judges give greater weight to commission recommenda-
tions than to staff reports written by persons directly accountable to legisla-
tors.272 Similarly, in interpreting referenda and public initiatives, courts
ignore likely notice by considering accompanying explanatory material,2"'
270 See Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969) ("A committee report represents the considered and
collective understanding of those Congressmen involved in drafting and studying prposed legislation.
Floor debates reflect at best the understanding of individual Congressmen. It would take extensive and
thoughtful debate to detract from the plain thrust of a committee report"); sce also 2A SUTHERLAND STAT.
CONST. § 48.06 ("iM]ost members of Congress are likely to consult the committee report in order to gain an
understanding of the purpose and effect of a bill before they cast their votes."); Eskridge, sipra note 26, at
638 (suggesting that sponsor statements receive weight because sponsors "are the Members of Congress
most likely to know what the proposed legislation is all about, and other Members can be expected to pay
special heed to their characterizations of the legislation").
271 Justice Antonin Scalia and Judge Kozinski both recognize this fact. Sce Wallace v. Christensen,
802 F.2d 1539, 1560 (9th Cir. 1986) (Kozinski, J.) ("Reports are usually written by staff or lobbyists, not
legislators; few if any legislators read the reports."); Hirsehey v. FERC, 777 F.2d 1, 7-8 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(Scalia, J., concurring) ('I frankly doubt that it is ever reasonable to assume that the details, as opposed to
the broad outlines of purpose, set forth in a committee report come to the attention of, much less are ap-
proved by, the house which enacts the committee's bill.).
This recognition may underlie the recent willingness to consider floor statements, which at least reflect
the intent of actual legislators. Indeed, Justice Scalia's argument that legislators do not read committee re-
ports relied upon a colloquy on the Senate floor. See Hirsciey, 777 F.2d at 7 n.I. The increasing use of
floor statements suggests that the theory for using legislative history might be shifting from constructive to
actual intent. The problem with relying on actual intent is that floor statements reflect only the beliefs of
one person, not the entire chamber.
272 For legislation originating from an outside commission, the accompanying description is most im-
portant. See Dickerson, supra note 266, at 1130-31 (explaining that reports ofofficial bodies charged with
finding legislative solutions are the most reliable type of legislative history); 2A SUTHERLAND STAT. CONSr
§ 48.09 (Norman J. Singer ed., 5th ed. 1992) (describing the well-settled rule that a report ofa commission
on a revision of statutory law is evidence of legislative intent and that such report is entitled to greater
weight than the report of a standing committee). Reporters' notes for uniform laws, for example, receive
great weight. See id. § 48.11 ("Official commentary on the Uniform Commercial Code has been cited as
'powerful dicta' and 'a most appropriate source' of law."). Even Justice Scalia relies on advisory commit-
tee notes. See Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 255 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (relying on advisory
committee note for meaning of federal rule of appellate procedure); United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554
(1988) (relying on advisory committee note for meaning of federal rule ofevidence).
273 See 2A SUTHERLAND STAT. CONST., supra note 266, § 48.19 (remarking that explanations and
informative materials on a proposed initiative are considered relevant legislative history for purposes of
its construction after enactment).
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but not media accounts.27 4 Finally, notwithstanding their centralposition in
the political deal, conference reports receive fewer citations27  and less
weighe276 than committee reports.
Second, constructive notice does not explain longstanding judicial will-
ingness to examine materials that could not have been noticed by the enacting
legislators. Courts traditionally consider postenactment staff descriptions of
statutes, which cannot provide notice to enacting legislators.277 Indeed, post-
enactment staff statements apparently receive more weight than those of rep-
resentatives themselves. A legislator's sworn testimony has long been in-
admissible on the issue of congressional intent.
278
Third, constructive notice does not explain the occasional use of legis-
lative history by textualist judges. Justice Scalia considers legislative his-
tory to confirm that Congress did not intend an absurd result,2' 9 and Judge
Easterbrook consults legislative history to determine the meaning of techni-
cal language.280 Constructive notice does not explain why textualists are
less concerned about manipulation in these situations.
274 See Schacter, supra note 269, at 130 ("Put simply, the hierarchy of interpretive sources that
courts consult in the asserted service of locating popular intent is roughly inverse to the hierarchy of in-
formational sources that voters consult most regularly in ballot campaigns.").
275 See Carro & Brann, supra note 66, at 291 (showing that from 1938-1979, 2% of Supreme Court
legislative history citations were to House or Senate conference reports).
276 See Costello, supra note 264, at 47-50 (ranking conference committee action and reports below
committee reports in hierarchy of materials).
277 See 2A SUTHERLAND STAT. CONST. § 48.06 (explaining that committee reports discussing previ-
ously enacted statutes are 'entitled to some consideration as a secondarily authoritative expression of
expert opinion') (quoting Bobsee Corp. v. United States, 411 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1969)). For example,
in interpreting tax legislation, courts regularly examine the General Explanation prepared by staff of the
Joint Committee on Taxation after enactment. See Michael Livingston, What's Blue and White and Not
Quite as Good as a Committee Report: General Explanations and the Role of "Subsequent" Tax Legis-
lative History, 11 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 91, 103 (1994) ("[C]ourts have almost uniformly been willing to
consult the Blue Book.").
278 See SUTHERLAND STAT. CONST. § 48.16 ("In construing a statute the courts refuse to consider
testimony about the intent of the legislature by members of the legislature which enacted it."); see also
City of Spokane v. State, 89 P.2d. 826, 828-29 (Wash. 1939) (holding legislator affidavits inadmissible
on legislative intent); cf. Western Air Lines v. Bd. of Equalization, 480 U.S. 123, 130 n.* (1987) (refus-
ing to consider lobbyist affidavit).
Another example ofjudicial willingness to examine materials not seen by the enacting legislators is
Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848 (1984), in which the Supreme Court relied upon an internal De-
partment of Justice memorandum never introduced into the legislative record. Id. at 857 n.14, 863 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) ("There is no indication that any Congressman ever heard of the document or knew
that it even existed."). See generally Note, The Value of Nonlegislators' Contributions to Legislative
History, 79 GEO. L.J. 359 (1990).
279 See supra note 221.
280 See In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1342 (7th Cir. 1989) (arguing that legislative history "may
show, too, that words with a denotation 'clear' to an outsider are terms of art, with an equally 'clear' but
different meaning to an insider"); Cont'l Can Co. v. Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers & Warehouse
Workers (Indep.) Pension Fund, 916 F.2d 1154, 1158 (7th Cir. 1990) (relying on a floor manager's defi-
nition that used a term of art "in the customary way").
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The interpretive community account better explains the use of legisla-
tive history. The hierarchy of legislative history reflects the origins of the
materials in different communities. Courts favor evidence emanating pri-
marily from the policy community. That community authors commission
recommendations, committee reports, conference reports, and sponsor
statements. Furthermore, preferences among these materials reflect their
proximity to the policy community. Commissions are typically dravn from
eminent members of the policy community; committee reports are written
by professional staff, albeit at the direction of members;281 conference re-
ports are staff descriptions of member decisions; and sponsor statements are
often, though not necessarily, written by staff.
282
The preference for materials from the policy community reflects the
role that community plays in most legal issues. Deeply immersed in the
statutory language with which courts grapple,283 this community simply has
more to say about issues typically confronting judges. Furthermore, this
community's cohesion permits it to reach consensus over the reasoned
analysis most usable by courts. These factors explain the great weight as-
signed advisory committee notes.284
By contrast, evidence from the political community-individual legis-
lator statements, press releases, hearing statements-generally receives less
weight. This community operates at a managerial level, further removed
from statutory language and the daily decisions facing courts.285  Further-
more, judges have greater difficulty utilizing evidence from the political
community. Such evidence does not represent the considered consensus of
a community guided by reasoned argument, but only one viewpoint in a
pluralistic process. Without a vote, it is uncertain whether a statement re-
flects the views of that community.
Thus, interpretive communities explain the present-law anomaly ac-
cording postenactment staff statements more weight than legislator testi-
mony. Postenactment staff statements at least represent the reasoned
281 See Brudney, supra note 3, at 49 ("It is widely recognized that congressional staffplay the major
role in drafting legislative history."); see also C. LAWRENCE EVANS, LEADERSHIP I COMMtTErr 127-34
(1991); KOFMEHL, supra note 101, at 118-26; Costello, supra note 264, at 137.
282 See Brudney, supra note 3, at 52 n.206 ("[F]loor statements by the bill manager and other leading
sponsors also are likely to be drafted by committee staff."); see also KOFmIL, supra note 101, at 123-24.
283 See Brudney, supra note 3, at 53 ("The same actors who draft legislative history are involved in
drafting statutory language.").
284 See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 167 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Having been pre-
pared by a body of experts, the Notes are assuredly persuasive scholarly commentaries--ordinarily the most
persuasive-concerning the meaning of the rules. But they bear no special authoritativeness as the work of
the draftsmen."). The preference for materials from the policy community also explains the willingness to
consider internal memoranda never introduced into the legislative record. Sce Kosah, 465 U.S. 848.
285 See Zeppos, supra note 24, at 1312 (proposing that while only a small proportion of legislators
read committee reports, "this would seem to be equally true of the text of the bill") (footnote omitted).
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consensus of an ongoing community. In contrast, legislator statements are
not representative outside the legislative process. 8 6
The interpretive community account also illuminates the textualist use
of legislative history. Textualist resistance to legislative history assumes
that such history emanates from the political community. "Manipulation" is
a problem only if there exists the competing interests distinctive of that com-
munity."8 7 Thus, textualists are more willing to consider legislative history
for nonpolitical issues. Take, for example, Justice Scalia's reliance on legis-
lative history to confirm that Congress did not intend an absurd result. Utter
silence indicates that the issue lacked political interest. Similarly, Judge
Easterbrook's examination of the legislative history of technical language re-
flects the fact that such language seldom engages the political community.
Finally, materials from the public community receive even less weight.
This community is usually far removed from issues facing courts. 28 Al-
though theoretically accessible, the public perspective rarely bears on statu-
tory interpretation.289 The public has at best a nodding acquaintance with
statutory language. Furthermore, media accounts lack authority. The diver-
sity of the public community weakens the claim of any text to being repre-
sentative. Together, the distance of the public community from legal issues
and the lack of authority help explain why judges interpreting referenda
consult explanatory materials, but not media descriptions.
C. Reliance on Administrative Interpretation
Finally, judges display widespread agreement over when to defer to
administrative interpretation.290 Such agreement is not readily understood
in terms of legal doctrine. Prior to Chevron, judges faced two conflicting
286 See Posner, supra note 131, at 275 ("The deal is struck when the statute is enacted. If courts
paid attention to subsequent expression of legislative intent not embodied in any statute, they would be
unraveling the deal that had been made; they would be breaking rather than enforcing the legislative
contract.").
287 Manipulation means "to change by . . . unfair means so as to serve one's own advantage."
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 708 (10th ed. 1993). That word, therefore, presumes
persons with differing interests. Manipulation cannot occur if the legislature is a unitary actor or delib-
erative forum, for in those situations there is no "other" to disadvantage.
288 This is true even of high profile bills. In describing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, for example,
Professor Schacter notes that "despite the extensive press coverage the 'quota' controversy received, lit-
tle of the legal complexity was--or perhaps could have been-captured in the media's characterizations
and coverage ofthe debate." Schacter, supra note 269, at 166.
289 It has more bearing, however, on foundational issues-thus, the reliance on the Federalist papers
in constitutional interpretation. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the Supreme Court Read
the Federalist but Not Statutory Legislative History?, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1301 (1998).
290 See Gregory E. Maggs, Reconciling Textualism and the Chevron Doctrine: In Defense of Justice
Scalia, 28 CONN. L. REV. 393, 413 (1996) (finding that, despite his extreme views, Justice Scalia usually
sided with the majority in Chevron cases); Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station:
An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1005-06 (finding that circuit
courts issue a single opinion in 87% of administrative law cases).
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rules:291  one requiring deference to administrative interpretation;?29 the
other authorizing independent judgment.293  Chevron ostensibly resolved
this conflict by formulating a two-step test. The court must first ask
whether Congress addressed the question before the court If so, congres-
sional intent controls. Second, if Congress did not address the question, the
court must ask if the agency interpretation is a permissible construction of
the statute. If so, the interpretation controls.
294
This two-step test, however, does not adequately explain the situations
in which courts defer to agency interpretations.295 Take, for example, the
divergent results reached in Chevron and Dimension Financial. In Chev-
ron, the Court determined that Congress had not addressed whether the term
"stationary source" referred to an entire plant and found permissible the
EPA's interpretation of that term. In Dimension Financial, it determined
that Congress had addressed whether the term "bank" referred to money
market funds and found the Federal Reserve's construction of that term un-
reasonable. These unanimous, yet opposing, opinions reflect an influence
outside the Chevron framework. Indeed, close reading reveals that the
291 See Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventua, 544 F.2d 35, 49 (2d Cir. 1976) (explaining that,
with respect to deference to agency interpretations of statutes, "there are two lines of Supreme Court de-
cisions on this subject which are analytically in conflict"), aWd sub noma. Northeast Marine Terminal
Operating Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249 (1977); KENNETH CuuP DAVIS, ADmiNtSTIRATIVE LAW OF THE
SEvEvimES 375 (1976) ("Mhe Supreme Court has long maintained two lines of cases on the scope of
review of applying law to undisputed or established facts. In one line, the Court substitutes judgment
and in the other it uses a reasonableness or rational basis test."); Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation
in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 549, 563-64 (1985); Llewellyn, supra note 4, at 404
("After enactment, judicial decision upon interpretation of particular terms and phrases controls," but
"[p]racticat construction by executive officers is strong evidence of true meaning.").
292 See, e-g., Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) ("When faced with a problem ofstatutory con-
struction, this Court shows great deference to the interpretation given the statute by the officers or
agency charged with its administration.").
293 See, e-g., Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166 (1970) C[W]here the only or principal dispute re-
lates to the meaning of the statutory term ... the controversy must ultimately be resolved, not on the ba-
sis of matters within the special competence of the (agency], but by judicial application of canons of
statutory construction.").
294 The Court wrote:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute that it administers, it is con-
fronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to
the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter, for the
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.
If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue,
the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the
absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with re-
spect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute.
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 84243(1984) (citations omitted).
295 Although Chevron makes deference the default rule, empirical studies show little effect on defer-
ence at the Supreme Court. See Merrill, Executive Precedent, supra note 27, at 984 (stating that an em-
pirical study of Supreme Court decisions found "no discemable relationship between the application of the
Chevron fiamework and greater acceptance of the executive view").
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Court applied the framework quite differently in the two cases. In Chevron,
the Court inquired into whether Congress had addressed the question by
asking whether Congress had "directly spoken to the precise question at is-
sue" and examining legislative history.2 96 In Dimension Financial, it con-
ducted that inquiry by asking whether the statute was "clear and
unambiguous" and focusing exclusively on statutory language.297 Applying
the Chevron approach to Dimension Financial might have altered the result
in that case. In a sense, Congress did not "directly" speak to the treatment
of money market funds because such funds did not exist when the excep-
tions to the Bank Holding Act were enacted.
Furthermore, the Court applied the second step quite differently in the
two cases. In Chevron, the Court found the EPA interpretation reasonable
because the scheme was "technical and complex, the agency considered the
matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion, and the decision involve[d] ...
conflicting policies. 2 98 In Dimension Financial, the Court adopted a nar-
row view of reasonableness, finding the agency interpretation unreasonable
because it conflicted with specific statutory language.299 Had the Court util-
ized the Dimension Financial approach in Chevron, it might have reached a
different conclusion. The EPA's interpretation of "stationary source" con-
tradicted prior case law defining that term.
300
An appreciation of interpretive communities helps explain judicial
agreement over the deference owed agency interpretation. First, the
weight attached to agency determinations diminishes for political deci-
sions. Such issues are not susceptible to the reasoned analysis in which
agencies excel. Second, the weight attached to agency determinations di-
minishes with their proximity to the legal community. The closer the
question to traditional legal expertise, the less the need to rely on outside
authority.
Both tendencies underlie the conflicting results reached in Chevron
and Dimension Financial. The issue in Dimension Financial was more
political. Over the years, Congress had enacted exceptions conferring
concentrated benefits upon specific industries. This political quality
makes text especially appealing in Dimension Financial. By contrast
Congress showed no interest in defining the term "stationary source."
' 01
296 467 U.S. at 842, 851-53.
297 474 U.S. 361 (1986).
298 467 U.S. at 865 (citations omitted).
299 474 U.S. at 373.
300 Circuit court precedent had already defined "stationary source" as excluding plantwide applica-
tion, at least for programs enacted to improve air quality. See Ala. Power v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 402
(D.C. Cir. 1979); ASARCO Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319, 326-27 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
301 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845 ("Congress did not have a specific intention on the applicability of the
bubble concept in these cases.").
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The question of plantwide application fell below the political radar
screen.
30 2
Furthermore, to the extent that it involved policy, the issue in Dimen-
sion Financial was more legal than the one involved in Chevron. Lawyers
regularly encounter "commercial loans" and "legal rights,"303 but not "sta-
tionary sources." Small wonder, then, that judges would find a plain mean-
ing in the Bank Holding Act, but not in the Clean Air Act.
IV. INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES AND THE RULES GOVERNING
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The interpretive community account bears not only on questions about
the appropriate theory or why judges reach agreement. It also bears on the
question: "What rules of interpretation should courts adopt?" Interpretive
communities shape widely held norms for statutory interpretation, the most
prominent of which is representative democracy. Political theorists have
long valued representative democracy for the decisions it produces.0 5 John
Stuart Mill regarded democracy as the government by the best qualified be-
cause the individual "is the only safe guardian of his own rights and inter-
ests. 306 James Madison argued that representation refined public views3P7
302
Congress intended to accommodate both interests, but did not do so itself on the level of
specificity presented by these cases. Perhaps that body consciously desired the Administrator to
strike the balance at this level, thinking that those with great expertise and charged with responsi-
bility for administering the provision would be in a better position to do so; perhaps it simply did
not consider the question at this level; and perhaps Congress was unable to forge a coalition on ci-
ther side of the question, and those on each side decided to take their chances with the scheme de-
vised by the agency. Forjudicial purposes, it matters not which ofthese things occurred.
Id. at 865.
303 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 947, 1323 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "commercial loan" and "le-
gal righ ").
304 See Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, Statutory Interpretation, Democratic Legitimacy and Legal-System
Values, 21 SErON HALL LEGIS. J. 233, 345 (1997) ("For decades, democratic legitimacy has served as
the principal touchstone ofstatutory interpretation theory."); Schacter, supra note 3 (describing scholarly
positions on statutory interpretation in terms ofdemocracy).
305 See generally Christopher J. Peters, Adjudication as Representation, 97 COLUM. L REV. 312,
330-37 (1997) (describing why democracy produces high quality decisions). Another tradition values
democracy because the process itself is morally valuable, regardless of the ultimate decisions. See id. at
323-30. Regarding representation as a concession to necessity, see id. at 339, that tradition has little to
say about representative decisionmaking.
306 JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1861), reprinted in
JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM, ON LIBERTY, AND CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESETATIVE
GOVERNMENT 187, 224 (H.B. Acton ed., J.M. Dent & Sons 1972); see also HERBERT SPENCEP, Repre-
sentative Government-What Is It Good For?, in THE MAN VERSUs THE STATE 331, 375 (Liberty Clas-
sics 1981) (1892) (A "man will protect his own interests more solicitously than others will protect them
for him. Manifestly, where regulations have to be made affecting the interests ofseveral men, they are
most likely to be equitably made when all those concerned are present, and have equal shares in making
of them.").
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by adding expertise.08 Accordingly, a representative "must act independ-
ently in his constituents' interest and yet not normally conflict with their
wishes., 309 Constituent opinion assumes greater importance for issues re-
quiring little knowledge.a 
s
The interpretive community account grounds theoretical accounts of
representative democracy in the "ways and attitudes of varied people" that
comprise our "working Constitution." 311  Governance involves a chain of
authority. Sovereignty resides in the public community, the persons ulti-
mately affected by governmental decisions. The public community entrusts
decisions to the political community.312 Responding to the national mood
as expressed in the media and public opinion polls, the political community
makes trade-offs among competing goods and delegates the remaining is-
sues to the policy community to "work out" over time.31 3 Representing the
public, 314 the policy community selects among a relatively narrow range of
options, relying on expertise to determine the public good.
Accordingly, representative democracy directs judges to adopt the per-
spective of the community responsible for the issue. As Felix Frankfurter
observed, "If a statute is written for ordinary folk, it would be arbitrary not
307 Madison claimed that a representative government would "refine and enlarge the public views
by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the
true interest of their country and whose patriotism and love ofjustice will be least likely to sacrifice it to
temporary or partial considerations." THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 126 (James Madison) (Isaac Kram-
nick ed., 1987).
308 See THE FEDERALIST No. 53, at 328 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) ("No man can
be a competent legislator who does not add to an upright intention and sound judgment a certain degree
of knowledge of the subject on which he is to legislate.").
309 HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 165 (1967).
310
The more a theorist sees political issues as questions of knowledge, to which it is possible to
find correct, objectively valid answers, the more inclined he will be to regard the representative as
an expert and to find the opinion of the constituency irrelevant. Ifpolitical issues are like scientific
or even mathematical problems, it is foolish to try to solve them by counting noses in the constitu-
ency. On the other hand, the more a theorist takes political issues to be arbitrary and irrational
choices, matters of whim or taste, the less it makes sense for a representative to barge ahead on his
own, ignoring the tastes of those for whom he is supposed to be acting. If political choices are like
the choice between, say, two kinds of food, the representative can only please either his own taste
or theirs, and the latter seems the only justifiable choice.
Id. at 211.
311 Llewellyn, supra note 76, at 26.
312 See STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 210 (1985) ("The
people must delegate responsibility for operating and monitoring the legitimacy of the legal system in its
details to a smaller community of persons.").
313 See Breyer, supra note 67, at 859 ("(The legislative] process requires each legislator to rely upon
staff, in the first instance to separate the matters that are significant from those that are not; it requires
each legislator to make decisions about, and to resolve with other legislators, each significant matter;
and it requires each legislator further to rely upon drafters and negotiators to carry out the legislator's
decisions.").
314 See PITKIN, supra note 309, at 116 (recognizing that in a democracy all officials might be
deemed "representatives" because all agencies of the government are servants of the sovereign people).
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to assume that Congress intended its words to be read with the minds of or-
dinary men. If they are addressed to specialists, they must be read with the
minds of specialists." 315 This means that public issues should be decided by
reference to the views of the public community, that political issues should
be decided by reference to the views of the political community, and that
policy issues should be decided by reference to the views of the policy
community.3
6
Though derived from representative democracy, this approach also fur-
thers317 another" 8 widely held norm for statutory interpretation-the rule of
law,319 which protects against anarchy, allows people to plan their affairs,
and limits official arbitrariness. 320 As Professor Fallon observed, the rule of
law consists of multiple strands:32' originalism, which connects judicial
opinions to democratically accountable legislatures; 3 2 formalism, which
provides private actors with clear prescriptions to guide behavior;32 and le-
gal process, which roots law in a current normative consensus.32 4  Justice
315 Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L REv. 527, 536
(1947). The entire statement reads:
Statutes are not archeological documents to be studied in a library. They are written to
guide the actions of men. As Mr. Justice Holmes remarked upon some Indian legislation "The
word was addressed to the Indian mind." If a statute is written for ordinary folk, it would be arbi-
trary not to assume that Congress intended its words to be read with the minds of ordinary men. If
they are addressed to specialists, they must be read with the minds of specialists. (citation omitted).
316 See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? 114 (1996):
What matters is for the judge to form a view of [purpose] that is continuous with the real
world of discourse and conflict from which that fragment of law came. Moreover, the view should
recognize the contestable and factional quality of each of the interests, concerns, and assumptions
to which it appeals They count not because they are the best and wisest but because they won, and
were settled, earlier down the road of lawmaking. Deference to literal meanings and shared expzc-
tations is simply the limiting case of a more general commitment to respect the capacity of parties
and movements to win in politics, and to encode and enshrine their victories in law.
317 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "'The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 37 n.187 (1997) ("Although democratically accountable lawmaking is not strictly
necessary for the Rule of Law, it is reasonable to anticipate that the elements of the Rule of Law... are
likely to be most fully realized when applicable rules and principles enjoy the support of democratic ma-
jorities or have been adopted through democratic processes.").
318 See Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 304, at 236, 266, 315 (describing legal system values as a second
foundation for statutory interpretation).
319 Lon Fuller defined "law" by reference to eight criteria: generality, publicity, prospectivity, clar-
ity, noncontradictoriness, capability of being followed, stability, and congruence between norms stated
and norms as applied. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33-39 (rev. ed. 1964).
320 See Fallon, supra note 317, at 8.
321 Id. at 6 ("The Rule of Law is best conceived as comprising multiple strands.... It is a mistake
to think of particular criteria as necessary in all contexts for the Rule of Law. Rather, we should recog-
nize that the strands of the Rule of Law are complexly interwoven, and we should begin to consider
which values or criteria are presumptively primary under which conditions.") (italics omitted).
322 See, e-g., RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN 19-20 (1987).
323 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CIn. L RE V. 1175, 1183
(1989).
324 See, eg., HART& SACKS, supra note 17, at 3-6.
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Frankfurter's observation furthers all three strands. It connects judicial
opinions to legislatures by identifying the issues of greatest concern to leg-
islators. It provides private actors with clear prescriptions by identifying
the audience requiring guidance.325 It roots law in consensus by identifying
the communities in which consensus should be sought.326
Justice Frankfurter's approach may conflict with some absolutist con-
ceptions of the rule of law. Some originalists may limit the policy commu-
nity's authority to work out details over time, and some formalists may
limit the use of specialized language. If, however, Professor Fallon is cor-
rect, and each strand, standing alone, is an incomplete account of the rule of
law,327 then the interpretive community account furthers that value.
Justice Frankfurter's precept provides a means for assessing rules of in-
terpretation. In a world in which most issues fall below the political radar
screen, rules adopting the policy perspective are useful guidelines, applica-
ble to most issues. Rules adopting other perspectives apply to fewer issues.
Rules adopting the political perspective for policy issues are misleading.
A. Useful Guidelines: Rules Adopting the Policy Perspective
Rules adopting the policy perspective are useful guidelines because most
issues facing judges are delegated to the policy community. Purposive inter-
pretation, therefore, is usually the appropriate theory of interpretation. Its as-
sumption of "reasonable persons pursuing reasonable ends reasonably"
captures the congressional expectation that the policy community will work
out details consistent with the political deal. This expectation gives courts
wide leeway to modify the original enactment for unforeseen circumstances.
The expectation that courts would work out the details authorizes the
Court's decision to rewrite the statute in Bock Laundry. It is clear that the po-
litical community did not intend to distinguish between plaintiffs and defen-
dants in civil suits. Furthermore, it is likely that Congress left the issue of
how to rewrite the statute to the policy community. The congressional focus
on criminal cases seems more the product of accident than of political com-
promise. Thus, in rewriting the statute, the Court should have adopted Justice
325 Thus, formalism does not necessarily require adopting plain meaning. See Stephen F. Ross, The
Limited Relevance of Plain Meaning, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1057, 1059 (1995):
[T]he concept of the "rule-of-law" is . . . frequently employed to describe the proposition that
"citizens ought to be able to read the statute books and know their rights and duties." Today, of
course .... legal rules are not communicated to the ordinary citizen "by their verbal formulation in
the statute books."... Where non-criminal statutes do apply to the citizenry, they usually do so via
administrative regulations ... or concern special areas of law that no ordinary citizen would at-
tempt to comply with without legal advice. Lawyers, unlike ordinary speakers of English, arc
likely to be familiar with the usual means of communication in the sub-community-the statute's
background and legislative history. (footnotes omitted).
326 See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 23-24 (1938) (arguing that professional
expertise provides a rule of law for administrative decision making).
327 Fallon, supra note 317, at 24-36. Justice Scalia, for example, subscribes to both originalism and
formalism, which sometimes conflict. See id. at 28, 30.
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Blackmun's policy perspective, which would have extended balancing to civil
as well as criminal cases. That approach was adopted in the later Supreme
Court revision of the rule328 in which Congress acquiesced.
The expectation that courts would work out the details undermines the
Court's opinion in Griffin.329 The silence on the issue of tolling damages af-
ter reemployment is telling evidence that the political deal reached no fur-
ther than doubling damages. 330  The failure of Congress to speak to the
issue indicates political acquiescence to judicial practice. To quote Arthur
Conan Doyle, "the fact that the dog did not bark can itself be significant.
' 33'
Subsequent practice in the political community suggests that tolling was
consistent with the legislative deal.332
Purposive interpretation is not the only rule adopting the policy per-
spective. Various doctrines of interpretation 333 adopt this perspective as
well. One such doctrine is the traditional hierarchy of legislative history.
By pointing toward the policy community and away from public under-
standings, that hierarchy highlights the materials most likely relevant to
courts. Another such doctrine is the canon assigning specialized meaning
to technical terms,334 generally appropriate because it incorporates the vo-
cabulary of the policy community. A third such doctrine is the canon read-
ing statutes in pari materia335 (that is, along with others relating to the same
subject matter), which assumes the ongoing life typical of the policy com-
munity. Finally, the canons avoiding redundancies 336 and reading statutes
328 See FED. R EVID. 609(a)(1), 609(a)(2) (effective December 1, 1990).
329 Another factor cutting against the Court's opinion is that narrowing the political deal mitigates
flaws in the legislative process. See infra text accompanying note 355.
330 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 3, at 201 ("The history of the statute suggests that Congress did not
expect such draconian recoveries when it made relatively minor amendments to the statute in 1898, and
the statute's purpose was just as much to compensate seamen as to deter employers from wrongdoing.").
331 Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 589 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
A. CONAN DOYLE, Silver Blaze, in THE COMPLErE SHERLOCK HOLtES 383 (1938)).
332 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 3, at 201 ('[E]quitable tolling of the double wages period ... was
widely accepted within the relevant interpretive communities (shipowners, insurers, labor organizations)
during this century.").
333 See ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 7, at 633 (distinguishing between theories and doctrines
of interpretation).
334 See Llewellyn, supra note 4, at 404 ("Words are to be taken in their ordinary meaning unless
they are technical terms or words of art," but "[p]opular words may bear a technical meaning and tech-
nical words may have a popular signification.").
335 Id. at 402 ('Statutes in pai materia must be construed together."). This principle also applies to
borrowed statutes, see Zerbe v. State, 578 P.2d 597 (Ala. 1978), and subsequent statutes, see 3
SUTHERLAND STAT. CONST. § 49.11 (Norman J. Singer ed., 5th ed. 2000).
336 See Llewellyn, supra note 4, at 404 ("Every word and clause must be given effect.").
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ejusdem generis (that is, an enumeration limits general words) 337 are useful
because they assume a rational actor speaking with a single voice.
338
B. Limited Principles
1. Rules Adopting the Political Perspective. Rules adopting the po-
litical perspective are limited principles, applying to unusual situations in
which the political community opined on the issue. In such cases, Congress
expects a particular result, not necessarily a reasonable one. Accordingly,
in these situations, purposive interpretation should give way to theories
aimed at discerning a particular result. Imaginative reconstruction of the
"deal" does so by replaying the circumstances of enactment, and plain
meaning does so by encouraging the political community to state its views
clearly. 339 Both theories narrow judicial latitude.
The expectation of particular results supports Judge Norris's detailed ex-
ploration of the legislative record in Montana Wilderness. At the same time,
this expectation undermines Justice Blackmun's opinion in Weber. Regard-
ing the issue of affirmative action as a practical problem of administration
and relying on agency interpretation and judicial precedent, Justice Blackmun
treated the question as one for the policy community. While such treatment
appeals to lawyers,340 it does not accord with the living Constitution. In
America, affirmative action is no mere policy matter left to specialists.
Similarly, generally useful doctrines of interpretation become less so
for issues from the political community. The hierarchy of legislative his-
tory, for example, weakens for issues outside the policy community and
thus should be regarded as describing only likely relevance, not weight. A
floor statement can rebut a committee report if the issue fell within the po-
litical community.34 1 The statement itself, along with subject matter and
other markers, would indicate such involvement.
Likewise, some canons of construction do not apply to political issues.
For such issues, the canon giving words a technical meaning should give
way to the one assigning words ordinary meaning.342 Take, for example,
337 See id. at 405 (stating that general terms "may be limited by specific terms with which they arc
associated" and "[wihere general words follow an enumeration they are to be held as applying only to
persons and things of the same general kind or class specifically mentioned (ejusdem generis).").
338 See Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmatics and the Maxims ofInterpretation, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 1179,
1200 (defending ejusdem generis because it "reflects the speaker's intention").
339 See supra text accompanying notes 164-66.
340 See Eskridge, supra note 19; Frickey, supra note 9, at 245, 259; see also RONALD DWORKIN,
How to Read the Civil Rights Act, in A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 316, 327 (1985) (arguing that Brennan's
result reflects "the best political justification for the statute").
341 See John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 673, 721
(1997) (criticizing the hierarchy of legislative history for giving committee reports more weight than
member statements).
342 See Llewellyn, supra note 4, at 404 (describing canons conferring ordinary meaning on statutory
language).
680
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Nix v. Hedden.343 In deciding whether a tomato was a fruit or a vegetable
for tariff purposes, the Court in that case rejected the botanical definition of
fruit as the pulp associated with a seed, and instead looked to common par-
lance which regards fruit as a sweet plant served as dessert.3" In the same
way, the canon reading statutes in pari materia becomes less persuasive for
political issues.345 The political community's volatility reduces the chance
that its views would carry over from statute to statute.41
Finally, the canons avoiding redundancies and reading terms ejusdem
generis lose power for the political community. That community's distance
from statutory language makes it far more tolerant of redundancies. a47 For
instance, during enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Senator Dirksen
demanded 348 explicit statutory language stating that Title VII of the bill did
not mandate quotas for minorities,349 notwithstanding the fact that such lan-
guage was likely superfluous.35 0 Likewise, eiusdem generis loses credibil-
ity for issues from the political community. That community often lacks
an overall intention that relates general language to enumerations. Indeed,
the lack of such intention supports the canon expressio unius (that is, the
expression of one thing excludes the other).352 In bargaining between op-
posing interests, the expression of one thing usually excludes another.
353
2. Rules Adopting the Public Perspective. Rules adopting the public
perspective are very limited principles, applying only in the rare situations
in which the political community fails to give voice to public understand-
ings. When the political machinery breaks down, democratic values permit
343 149 U.S. 304 (1893).
344 Id.
345 See Llewellyn, supra note 4, at 402 ("A statute is not in pari materla if its scope and aim are dis-
tinct or where a legislative design to depart from the general purpose or policy of previous enactments
may be apparent.").
346 See Posner, supra note 131, at 274 ("lf some statutes ... reflect the pressure of narrow interest
groups rather than any coherent view of the public interest, it is perilous for courts to use one statute to
illuminate the meaning of another. There is no assurance that the particular constellation of political
pressure that produced the first statute was also at play when the second was adopted:).
347 See Llewellyn, supra note 4, at 404 (explaining that language may be rejected as surplusage "(ijf
inadvertently inserted or if repugnant to the rest of the statute").
348 See Francis J. Vaas, Title Vfk. Legislative Hisiory, 7 B.C. INDus. & Co. L L REv. 431, 450 (1966).
349 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (2000) (providing that nothing in the Civil Rights Act requires grant-
ing preferential treatment because of race).
350 Section 703G) was arguably unnecessary because Section 703(a) already prohibited discrimina-
tion on the basis of race. See ESKRIDGE & FI=cKEY, supra note 7, at 22 (describing many amendments
as "cosmetic").
351 See Llewellyn, supra note 4, at 405 ("General terms are to receive a general construction," and
"general words must operate on something:).
352 See id.
353 Cf Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 16 ("The more detailed the law, the more evidence of interest-
group compromise.").
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the judiciary to leapfrog the legislature, modifying or imposing legislative
mandates in the name of popular sovereignty.
The best-established rules adopting the public perspective are the can-
ons governing strict and liberal construction. These canons apply widely
but with limited impact, affecting statutes at the margin. The democratic
justification for these canons is that they mitigate systemic imperfections in
the legislative process. Strict construction cures over-responsiveness to or-
ganized groups, 355 and liberal construction increases the power of under-
represented interests.
356
The difficulty, of course, is identifying the statutes deserving strict or
liberal construction. 357 Weber and Bob Jones are difficult3 58 in part because
people argue over whether civil rights statutes deserve strict or liberal con-
struction. Civil rights statutes might be viewed as conferring economic
benefits on an organized group at the expense of society at large.360 Justice
Scalia, in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, for example, used the diffuse in-
terests of white men to justify a narrow reading of Title VII. 36' Such a view,
however, runs counter to the history of race relations in America. Notwith-
standing their discrete status, racial minorities are not privileged, but margin-
alized. Furthermore, Americans do not regard racial equality simply as an
354 See UNGER, supra note 316, at 117-18 ("The ideal of popular self-government usually finds its
best judicial defense in the modesty of the standard practice .... [Nevertheless, there are] circum-
stances in which the judges may properly take it upon themselves to cut through a Gordian knot in the
law with their swords of constructive interpretation. They may do so under the promptings of the ideal
of popular self-government.").
355 See supra text accompanying note 171 (discussing Montana Wilderness).
356 One example is the tradition of reading statutes in favor of Indians. See Philip P. Frickey, Con-
gressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 CAL. L.
REv. 1137, 1177-78 (1990) (describing the tradition of preserving Indian rights from congressional en-
croachment, unless Congress has spoken clearly on the issue).
357 Doctrinally, the question is often whether a court should apply strict construction to statutes in
derogation of the common law and liberal construction to remedial legislation. See Llewellyn, supra
note 4, at 401 ("Statutes in derogation of the common law will not be extended by construction," but
"[s]uch acts will be liberally construed if their nature is remedial."); see also id. at 402 ("A statute im-
posing a new penalty or forfeiture, or a new liability or disability, or creating a new right or action will not
be construed as having a retroactive effect," but "[r]emedial statutes are to be liberally construed and if a
retroactive interpretation will promote the ends ofjustice, they should receive such construction,").
358 Technically, these cases did not liberally construe civil rights acts. No such statute applied in
Bob Jones, and Weber narrowly construed the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Both cases, however, increased
the power of groups arguably underrepresented in the legislature.
359 See generally DWORKIN, supra note 340, at 327; Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products,
98 HARV. L. REv. 713 (1985); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Is Carolene Products Dead? Reflec-
tions on Affirmative Action and the Dynamics of Civil Rights Legislation, 79 CAL. L. REV. 685 (1991).
360 See Geoffrey P. Miller, The True Story of Carolene Products, 1987 Sup. CT. REv. 397, 428
("[D]iscrete and insular minorities are exactly the groups that are likely to obtain disproportionately
large benefits from the political process.").
361 See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 676-77 (1987) (Sealia, J., dissenting) (noting that ex-
tension of Weber would accommodate the demands of organized groups at the expense of unknown, unaf-
fluent, unorganized individuals).
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economic issue involving a narrow group, but as an ideological issue impact-
ing all of society.
Canons governing strict and liberal construction are not the sole means
by which courts draw on public opinion to bypass the legislature. A court
can ignore the governing statute and develop its own rules based on wide-
spread cultural understandings. Such development is obviously more ad-
venturous than mere liberal construction, but it may be democratic if it
gives voice to preferences slighted in the legislative process. Cultural un-
derstandings may, however, defy translation into legal language. Public
opinion often coalesces around fuzzy symbols362 rather than the sharply
bounded categories more prominent in legal reasoning.
The legitimacy of developing rules based on the public perspective ulti-
mately turns on how well courts discern popular preferences.163  In Bob
Jones, the Court proved right. Racial segregation was widely accepted when
Congress enacted section 501(c)(3) in 1894.364 By 1983, however, segrega-
tion in education was widely recognized as incompatible with equal opportu-
nity. The result in Bob Jones proved remarkably noncontroversial over time.
In Weber, the court may have been wrong. The ideal of equal opportunity is
ambiguous with respect to afftrmative action in employment. For blacks, af-
firmative action may be essential to assuring equal opportunity; for whites,
affirmative action may foreclose such opportunity. Thus, beneath the ideal is
a deep social division that undermines any judicial resolution of the issue.365
In developing rules based on the public perspective, courts must recog-
nize that opinion changes over time. Issues sometimes fall out of the public
limelight. At the turn of the century, for example, public outrage at concen-
trations of wealth precipitated the enactment of the Sherman Act;366 and in
limiting that Act's prohibition of "every contract... in restraint of trade
367
to unreasonable restraints of trade, the Supreme Court's opinion in Standard
Oil v. United States368 "gave rise to a crisis of opinion such as only a hand-
362 Popular symbols create the consensus necessary to mobilize mass support. Sce COnB & ELDER.,
supra note 100, at 28 (arguing that symbols provide the vehicle through wYhich diverse motivations, ex-
pectations and values are synchronized to make collective action possible); STONE, supra note 85, at 125
(1988) (noting that ambiguity of symbols "allows highly conflictual issues to move from stalemate to
action.").
363 See UNGER, supra note 316, at 118 (describing judicial activism as "a gamble for support," and
observing that its claims for legitimacy "are greatly strengthened" when reformers "can appeal to a
broad-based current of opinion in society").
364 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (establishing separate but equal doctrine).
365 Rarely does a judicial decision itself shape public opinion. Se MARSHALL, supra note 190, at
154 (concluding that few Supreme Court decisions change public opinion).
366 See David Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S. CAL L. REV. 1219, 1224
(1988) (attributing the Sherman Act to "pervasive public outrage over the great trusts, and popular de-
mand for the restoration of a balance of economic power in American society").
367 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1999).
368 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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ful of the Court's decisions have provoked. 369 Over the century, however,
this outrage subsided,370 and the Sherman Act today falls largely within the
domain of lawyers and economists, neither of whom ever supported an ab-
solute prohibition. 371 The Act is now widely recognized as falling within
the policy community.
372
At the same time, issues sometimes gain in public prominence. Take,313
for example, Braschi v. Stahl Associates, which considered whether a rent
control statute that protected members of a deceased tenant's "family" cov-
ered a gay tenant's partner. Gay rights were not a public issue in the 1940s
when the statute was enacted.374 By 1989, however, gay rights had received
considerably more attention and fell within the public community.
375
C. Misleading Rules
1. The Additional Weight Accorded Statutory Precedent. Rules
adopting the political perspective for issues usually delegated to the policy
community are positively misleading. One such doctrine accords greater
weight to precedents interpreting statutes than to those developing the com-
369 WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA 253 (1965).
370 See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, in THE PARANOID
STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 189 (1965).
371 See LETWIN, supra note 369, at 76-77 (observing that economists believed efforts to limit com-
binations were futile, and lawyers believed the common law was an adequate remedy). Robert Bork
finds in the Act an intent to prohibit inefficient combinations, see Robert Bork, Legislative Intent and
the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7, 7, 10 (1966) (finding economic efficiency to be the
purpose behind the Sherman Act), a belief limited to economists, see Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers
as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34
HASTINGS L.J. 65, 88 (1982) (arguing that legislators who enacted the Sherman Act did not know that
monopolies caused allocative inefficiency).
372 See supra note 153 (describing Posner and Easterbrook's views); see also William F. Baxter, Sepa-
ration of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the "'Common Law" Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L.
REv. 661 (1982) (arguing that the antitrust laws delegate authority to the judiciary and executive).
373 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
374 See id. at 52 ("[Tlhe term 'family' is not defined in the rent-control code and the legislative his-
tory is devoid of any specific reference to the non-eviction provision."). The rent control statute was
enacted in 1946, see Emergency Housing Rent Control Law of 1946, L. 1946, ch. 274, codified as
amended at N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §§ 8581-8597 (McKinney 1987), and the policy of not evicting
family members dates back to that period. See, e.g., Park East Land Corp. v. Fikelstein, 299 N.Y. 70
(N.Y. 1949). The regulation at issue in the case was originally issued in 1962. See New York City Rent,
Rehabilitation and Eviction Regulation sec. 56(d).
375 Statutes prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation were not enacted until the
1980s. See Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States: Decoding the Discourse of
Equivalents, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 283, 286-87 (1994). In Braschi, the court received seven ami-
cus briefs. See Briefs of Amicus Curiae The Association of the Bar of the City of New York; The City
of New York; Family Service America; The Gay Men's Health Crisis, Inc.; The Lambda Legal Defense
and Education Fund; The Legal Aid Society of New York City; Community Action for Legal Services;
Inc., Braschi v. Stahl Ass'n Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989) (No. 02194-87). In fact, the New York
State legislature ultimately codified the Court's holding. See Rent Stabilization Code, N.Y. Comp.
Codes R. & Regs. Tit. 9, 2520.6(o)(2) (1990).
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mon law.376 That doctrine assumes that by failing to act, Congress adopts ex-
isting judicial interpretation.3 77 Scholars debate the merits of this assumption.
Professor Eskridge argues that there are substantial obstacles to political mo-
bilization.3 78 Congress cannot overturn every decision lacking majority sup-
port.379  Conceding that fact, Professor Marshall nonetheless argues that an
absolute rule of stare decisis would increase congressional oversight of judi-
cial opinions.3 80
The interpretive community account reveals a deeper problem with a
rule according special weight to statutory precedents: The political com-
munity pays little attention to judicial interpretation. 38 1 Very few judicial
opinions receive attention outside the policy community, which standing
alone has little influence upon the legislative agenda. 382 Furthermore, it is
hard to believe that the judiciary could change this state of affairs. Concerned
chiefly with re-election, politicians are unlikely to be swayed by a rule of
construction. Thus, the doctrine giving extra weight to statutory precedents
makes erroneous assumptions regarding community responsibility. The dis-
tance of most precedent from the political community leaves the rule granting
additional weight to statutory interpretation without credible foundation.
Unlike other rules departing from the legislative perspective, the rule is not
376 Compare William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. LJ. 1361 (19S8)
(criticizing the presumption against overruling statutory precedents), with LawTence C. Marshall, "Let
Congress Do It". The Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MicH. L REV. 177
(1989) (taking the contrary position).
377 See Eskridge, supra note 376, at 1397 ("The traditional argument for the super-strong presump-
tion is that once the Court interprets a statute, Congress is the institution competent to change that inter-
pretation."); Marshall, supra note 376, at 184 ("The conventional explanation for the heightened role of
stare decisis in statutory cases is that congressional failure to enact legislation reversing a judicial d,ci-
sion indicates Congress's approval of the Court's interpretation of an earlier statute.').
378 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L REV. 67, 94 (1988).
See generally John Grabow, Congressional Silence and the Search for Legislative Intent: A Venture into
"Speculative Unrealities, " 64 B.U. L. REv. 737 (1984).
379 Professor Eskridge observes, for example, that notwithstanding their majority status, white men
have not convinced Congress to overrule Weber. See Eskridge, supra note 376, at 1410-11.
380 See Marshall, supra note 376, at 210.
381 See HARRY VELLINGTON, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE SUPRE.ME COURT AD ilE
PROCESS OF ADiUDIcATIoN 11 (1990); Abner J. Mikva, How Vell Does Congress Support and Defend
the Constitution?, 61 N.C. L. REv. 587, 609 (1983) (claiming that "most Supreme Court decisions never
come to the attention of Congress"). Professor Eskridge has shown that the number ofcongressional over-
rides increased from 1967 to 1990 and that almost half of the Supreme Court decisions are considered in
oversight hearings. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Deci-
sions, 101 YALE Li'. 331, 338,343 (1991). Still, only 7% of Supreme Court decisions are overridden, d. at
350, and staff interest may account for much of the hearing activity, id. at 339 (attributing increased atten-
tion to growth in congressional stall). Moreover, as Eskridge concedes, few circuit court cases receive con-
gressional attention. Id at 343, n.29 (citing study by Robert Katzman indicating that staff was unaware of
12 of 15 significant statutory cases decided in the D.C. Circuit in 1989).
382 Public community interest is critical to congressional action. Sce Joseph Ignagni ct al., Statutoiy
Construction and Congressional Response, 26 AMi. POL Q. 459, 477 (1998) (concluding that Congress
is most likely to respond to Supreme Court disposition of salient issues).
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based on judicial responsibility to protect the rule of law.383 In fact, the rule
abdicates judicial responsibility in the name of legislative supremacy.
2. The Chevron Doctrine. Another misleading doctrine is the two-
step test announced in Chevron.384 Prior to that case, judicial deference to
administrative decisions ranged from great to none, depending on the pres-
ence of various factors.3 85 The Chevron two-step test revolutionized 316 the
law by making the decision to defer an "all-or-nothing matter' '387 and defer-
ence to agency interpretation "the default rule." 388 This test rendered obso-
lete the traditional factors used to assign weight to agency interpretations
389
and dramatically shrank the judicial role.
The basis for this revolution is found in the Court's new theory for def-
erence.390 Chevron broke new ground by basing deference on agencies' po-
litical accountability. 39' This new rationale, if true, would justify Chevron's
revolution. Political determinations are all or nothing because they are not
383 The canon avoiding constitutional issues, for example, departs from likely legislative under-
standings, but may nonetheless serve the rule of law. Although Congress probably intends to legislate to
the extent of its power, the canon protects the judicial function. See HENRY J. FRIENDLY, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes, in BENCHMARKS 211 (1967) ("The strongest basis for the rule
is ... that the Supreme Court ought not to indulge in what, if adverse, is likely to be only a constitu-
tional advisory opinion.").
384 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
385 See Diver, supra note 291, at 562 n.95 (listing factors cited by the Supreme Court in deciding
whether to defer to administrative interpretations).
386 See Merrill, Executive Precedent, supra note 27, at 976 (stating that Chevron "contained several
features that can only be described as 'revolutionary"') (quoting Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in
the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 284 (1986)); see also ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note
7, at 861 ("The conventional wisdom in administrative law is, or at least until recently was, that Chevron
was a revolutionary decision that ushered in a new period of greater deference to agency interpretations
ofstatutes they are charged with enforcing.").
387 Merrill, Executive Precedent, supra note 27, at 977 ("[T]he two-step structure makes deference
an all-or-nothing matter.... In effect, Chevron transformed a regime that allowed courts to give agen-
cies deference along a sliding scale into a regime with an on/off switch.").
388 Id. ("As a result [of Chevron], independent judgment now requires special justification, and def-
erence is the default rule.").
389 See id. (arguing that the Chevron "framework appears to exclude any examination of the multi-
ple factors historically relied upon by courts [in deciding whether to defer to agency interpretations of
statutes].... [N]one of the traditional factors fits under step one or step two of the new framework.").
390 See id. at 978 ("In addition to its novel framework, Chevron also broke new ground by invoking
democratic theory as a basis for requiring deference to executive interpretations.").
391 See 467 U.S. at 865-66 ("While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief
Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such pol-
icy choices-resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve
or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of
everyday realities.").
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susceptible to reasoned criticism. Furthermore, political accountability
provides a uniform reason favoring agency interpretation.
392
The political accountability rationale, however, misidentifies the re-
sponsible community. Political accountability is critical only to issues
within the political community. Most agency decisions fall below the po-
litical radar screen. The vast majority come from the policy community,
with the political input occurring only at the most general level. Therefore,
agencies seldom rise above courts in the chain of authority. They are usu-
ally equal.393 Courts and agencies draw from different policy subcommuni-
ties, each with unique expertise. 94
Thus, the interpretive community account supports pre-Chevron law,
which based deference on expertise.3 95 Most agency interpretations do not
pose an all-or-nothing choice; they are susceptible to reasoned analysis and
critique by courts.396 Furthermore, the weight to be accorded agency deci-
sions is not uniform, but variable, depending upon the strength of the under-
lying reasoning. Many of the traditional factors acknowledge this fact.
Courts give more weight to administrative interpretations that fall within
the agency's specialized knowledge3 97 and are well-reasoned 39" and less
weight to interpretations contradicted by other agencies.
3 99
392 See Merrill, Executive Precedent, supra note 27, at 978 ("In order to make deference a general
default rule, the Court had to come up with some universal reason why administrative interpretations
should be preferred to the judgments of Article IllI courts. Democratic theory supplied the justification:
agency decisionmaking is always more democratic than judicial decisionmaking because all agencies are
accountable (to some degree) to the President and the President is elected by the people.").
393 See id. at 1008-09 (comparing judges and agencies to courts from coordinate jurisdictions).
394
Executive interpreters have greater expertise on matters that are highly technical or com-
plex; they have more familiarity with the overall structure of a statutory program, and with the
policies followed under these programs; and they are more accountable to the public. On the other
hand, courts are more insulated from political pressures than agencies; their members are more
likely to be selected for their legal abilities than are agency heads; they may be able to hire better
law clerks; and they may have more time to do research and write opinions, if only because they
are exempt from the statutory deadlines often imposed on agencies.
Id. at 1009.
395 See ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 7, at 860 (noting that deference to agency interpretations
of law is traditionally based on expertise). Chevron itself acknowledged the importance of expertise.
The Court alluded to the "great expertise" of the agency and noted that "judges are not experts in the
field." 467 U.S. at 865.
396 See Merrill, Executive Precedent, supra note 27, at 998 ("Chevron almost guarantees that in
every case the independent views of the judiciary will be given either too much or too little weight, and
concomitantly, that the views of the agency will be given either too little or too much deference.-).
397 See, eg., Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Cent. Lincoln Peoples' Util. Dist., 467 U.S. 380,390 (1984).
398 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (explaining that the weight accorded
administrative interpretation depends upon "the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of
its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it
power to persuade").
39 See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 664-66 (2d ed. 1984) (discussing case where
agencies adopted conflicting positions on the meaning ofa statute).
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This means that the Chevron framework should apply rarely, if at all.
It is questionable whether that doctrine should have applied in Chevron it-
self. Even if the issue of plantwide application was political when the case
was brought,400 it is unclear whether the President's decision to ease indus-
try standards deserved deference. In our system, the President serves a na-
tional constituency that often transcends distributional politics.
40'
Conferring concentrated benefits on narrow groups clashes with this role.
Indeed, judges traditionally respected agency decisions because they are in-
sulated from partisan pressures.02
Whatever its applicability to Chevron itself, the framework is poorly
suited to most cases. Most administrative interpretations receive little po-
litical input. The Court may be recognizing this bad fit by limiting, re-
formulating, 4  and igoring- Chevron.
400 By lowering emissions standards, the regulation was distributional in that it benefited industries at
the expense of the public. Political interest is also evident in the shift in EPA positions that occurred with a
change in Administrations. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 857-58. Finally, several amicus briefs were filed in
the Supreme Court. See Briefs of Amici Curiae The American Gas Association, The Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, The Mid-America Legal Foundation, The Pacific Legal Foundation, The United Steelwork-
ers of America, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (No. 82-1005).
401 The President's high visibility and broad constituency makes him least vulnerable to interest
group pressure. See STEVEN KELMAN, MAKING PUBLIC POLICY 83-87 (1987) (ascribing a President's
public spiritedness to voters' conception of the presidency); DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: TilE
ELECTORAL CONNECTION 169 (1974) ("Since presidents can be held individually accountable for broad
policy effects and states of affairs, they are likely to go about their business with a vigorous insistence
on instrumental rationality.").
402 See ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 7, at 860 (noting that deference to agency interpretations
of law is traditionally based on "neutrality," i.e., insulation from "partisan" pressures). The traditional
factors favor interpretations that are insulated from political factors by giving weight to interpretations
that are long-standing, see, e.g., United States v. Clark, 454 U.S. 555, 565 (1982); Haig v. Agee, 453
U.S. 280, 291 (1981), or contemporaneous with enactment of the statute, see Norwegian Nitrogen Prods.
Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933).
403 See Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 130-31 (1990) (holding Chev-
ron inapplicable when the Court has already interpreted the statute); Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp.,
488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988) (holding Chevron inapplicable to agency litigating positions); Edward J. De-
Bartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gold Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 574-75 (1988) (relying
on canon avoiding constitutional issues rather than the Chevron rule); INS v. Cardoza.Fonseca, 480 U.S.
421, 446-48 (1987) (holding Chevron inapplicable to a "pure question of statutory construction"). The
Court has backtracked on some of these exceptions. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (refusing
to follow DeBartolo); NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Worker Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 112,
133-34 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that Cardoza-Fonseca is no longer being followed by the
Court).
404 See Merrill, Executive Precedent, supra note 27, at 990-92 (describing how the first step in the
Chevron test, which originally required an examination of "specific intention" on the "precise issue" at
hand, has been modified as requiring a determination of the plain meaning of the statute as a whole).
405 Professor Merrill has shown that the Court has adopted its framework in only 36% of its cases
from 1984 to 1990, while citing traditional factors in 37%. See Merrill, Executive Precedent, supra note
27, at 981.
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V. CONCLUSION
Much legal scholarship on statutory interpretation focuses on the the-
ory appropriate to hard cases. In debating the choice between intent, text,
and best answer in cases such as Weber, scholars appeal to divergent, appar-
ently incompatible, models of the legislature.
This Article makes three grand claims. The first is that government in-
volves three interpretive communities, each with its distinctive behavior
and sphere of influence. The public community reacts from cultural stereo-
types; the political community negotiates and votes; the policy community
reasons analytically. The public's impact is strongest at the general level;
the policy community's impact is strongest at the level of detail.
The second claim is that interpretive communities affect how judges
decide cases. Judges tend to adopt the theory of interpretation appropriate
to the community responsible for the issue before them. They look to text
for political issues and intent for policy issues. Judges recognize the policy
community's immersion in statutory detail by citing committee reports
more often than other sources of legislative history. Judges recognize the
importance of the policy community in the administrative state by deferring
to agency resolutions of technical issues.
The third claim is that interpretive communities should affect how
judges decide cases. Each community claims legitimacy in a representative
democracy. Accordingly, judges should adopt rules of interpretation appro-
priate to the community responsible for the issue before them. Because
most such issues are technical, this generally means adopting rules appro-
priate to the policy community. Rules presuming political involvement, like
the Chevron two-step test, are usually misguided.
These claims cast a new light on statutory interpretation scholarship.
They suggest that the current debate is overdrawn. Courts do not face stark
choices among theories of interpretation and models of the legislature.
Each theory and model is valid. The rub comes in determining which the-
ory applies when. In practice, statutory interpretation depends more on
contextualized understandings than on absolutist claims.
Furthermore, these claims suggest that current priorities are awry.
High profile cases like Weber are intellectually stimulating, but atypical of
judicial dockets. Most cases lack such notoriety. Recognition of interpre-
tive communities presents a more accurate, if less dramatic, picture of statu-
tory interpretation.
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